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BORDER ISSUES OF SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES IN ASIA-AN
INTRODUCTION
Ralph H. Magnus, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
In October 1992, as if to confirm the direction of the discussions
presented here, the three Central Asian republics bordering on China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Uzbekistan, sent
representatives to Beijing to begin to settle the outstanding border
Issues left unresolved after three decades of Sino-Soviet
negotiations. Disputed as having been imposed by "unequal treaties"
in the nineteenth century, Beijing now faces several weak neighbors
of negligible military standing instead of the Soviet superpower
across the negotiating table. What cards do these newly independent
republics hold? What is the future of international borders in this
region? The Beijing border negotiations may well be just the tip of
the iceberg.
The dismantlement of the Soviet empire in 1991 has thus forced
the re-emergence of political issues which had lain dormant since
the beginning of this century. Many of these involved the
demarcation of former Soviet borders in Asia inherited from the old
Tsarist imperial arrangements of the nineteenth century, in the
course of this century and after World War II in particular, the
states bordering on the former Soviet empire have gained in
political prestige and international standing. They are a long way
from the unequal Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, which granted the
Soviets the unilateral right of military intervention in Iran should
they feel threatened on their southern border. This article 6 was no
mere historical curiosity, for despite its repudiation by Iran the
Soviet government continued to assert its validity down to the end
of the 1980s.
Added to such international issues, the new states of Central
Asia are forced into the position of creating viable nation-states to
replace the nominal identity they held as Soviet Socialist Republics
in the old Soviet Union. In most serious issues, they were mere
ciphers for the dictates of the Soviet central government and the
Politburo of the CPSU in Moscow. As pointed out in the epilogue to
this study, the ethnic-nationality Soviet republics were a kind of
Soviet "mandate system" of colonial divide and rule, which gave
some cultural autonomy to capture the support of local elites, but
which lacked even the formal goal of the League of Nations mandate
system of preparation for full independence. Rather the Soviet
system aimed at the relacement of all ethnicity with unity and with
the new "Soviet man".
Today, we see the bordering states and the renewed Chinese
Central Asian imperial system acting to revive historical ties and
ambitions severed for over seven decades. We also have in Central
Asian states themselves the legacy of seven decades of the
existence of ethnically-based entities which has, if nothing else,
created separate groups of political, economic and social elites. In
this process of restoring ties and historical consciousness political
awareness of the separation of current ethnic groups, past
territorial claims, and a sense of unity stemming from an awareness
of the common heritage of past history, culture and religion, are
leading to the questioning of the validity of current international
borders.
Simultaneously, and not unrelated events surrounding the collapse
of the Soviet Union, has been the fact that similar issues have been
raised in the Middle East proper in the defeat of Iraq by a
international coalition in 1991, following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990. These events reopened one of the major ethnic
issues arising from the post-World War I settlements, that of the
Kurds, but it created a new involvement of the international system
as a whole in the form of United Nations resolutions and the
deployment of United Nations military observers, relief workers,
etc. in the Kurdish regions of Iraq.
To explore some of these issues, even though they are scarcely
formed as issues much less having solutions at hand, the U.S. Army
War College sponsored the convening of a conference, under the
chairmanship of Ralph H. Magnus of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, at the Asilomar Conference Center, Pacific Grove,
California, in June 1992. The preparations for the meeting, including
topics and possible participants was done in collaboration with Dr.
Eden Naby of the Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern
Studies, who had just returned from two extended periods of
residence in Tajikistan. We decided to have the conference as small
as possible to cover the major issues and geographic areas involved.
The participants were invited to make their comments on their
topics as formally or informally as they wished, allowing most of
the time for mutual interchanges with other participants. A small
number of interested scholars from the Naval Postgraduate School
were invited to join in the discussions. The readers, of course, will
judge for themselves, but the format proved to be interesting and
provocative. Although not all participants had known each other,
except by reputation, before these three days of informal and
formal meetings, all felt very well acquainted with the others'
views when we parted. One difficulty, to which the reader might be
alterted, is that as much of the conference involved exchanges of
views by the participants instead of formal papers, as editor I have
endeavored to preserve this flavor by only slightly editing the
remarks of the speakers. Thus, as many Ideas of the presenters of
the topics were interrupted by questions, discussions of interesting
issues that had been raised, and relationships that seemed to have
arisen to earlier topics and discussions, the reader might feel
somewhat at a loss to follow the argument. Yet, given the fluidity
of all of these issues and the scholarly qualifications of the
participants, the editor feels that the major issues covered by each
of the participants are eventually presented as their authors have
wished and the discussions reproduced here are germane and enhance
the readers' knowledge of the topic of Asian borders of the former
6Soviet Union as a whole.
Conference Participants
Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barrack, Pennsylvania
June Teufel Dreyer, Department of Political Science, University
of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida
Graham E. Fuller, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Ralph H. Magnus, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
Eden Naby, The Middle East Center, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
M. Siddieq Noorzoy, Department of Economics, University of
Alberta, Edmundton, Alberta, Canada
Stephen C. Pelletiere, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War









CHINESE CENTRAL ASIAN BORDERS
June Teufel Dreyer, University of Miami, Florida
Recent events in both China and former Soviet Central Asia have
made it more difficult for China to keep control of Xinjiang. There
will certainly be a looser relationaship and more bargaining to get
Xinjiang to accept China's rule.
In 1977 there were major separatist movements in both Chinese
and Soviet Central Asia. Many in Soviet Central Asia in the 1970s
had hoped that the Chinese would be their savior from Soviet rule.
However, both Chnia and the Soviets became more balanced in their
relationship; both felt themselves vulnerable. Their hostility
became more sniping at one another. By 1980-81, they became more
friendly and neither had an incentive to upset the other.
This did not mean that all was well on the Chinese side of the
border. There is a Chinese saying that there is a small revolt in
Xinjiang every three years and a big revolt every five. But from the
1980s to today it has been more like a revolt every year. They have
also been widespread geographically. Seemingly with a number of
"causes" (at least as officially reported), most of them appear to be
relatively minor but always spreading. In 1980 the Kashgar
"counter-revolutionary" elements were to blame. In 1981 there
seems to have been a more serious proximate cause. The People's
Liberation Army had taken over some land and a Uighur man walking
on the PLA land was shot and killed after a guard's warning. This
was a particularly large revolt. The PLA agreed to have the guard
stand trial, but the army freed him from prison and bombarded the
local party secretariat. Outside troops had to be brought in to
restore order. In 1985 a revolt centered on nuclear testing at Lop
Nor, spreading to the minority community in Beijing. In 1988 there
were two revolts, in Kashgar and in the Hi valley. Their cause was
given as an obscenity written on the door of a university dormitory.
In 1989 another revolt was attributed to attacks made on the
conduct of Muslims during the Haj, which the rumors said included
sexual orgies. In 1990 the cause of the revolt was given as protests
against the authorities razing "illegal" mosques. The imams of the
mosques were also accused of "forcing" people to believe in Islam,
thus violating the Chinese constitution's guarantee of "freedom" of
religious belief. In Kyrgyz areas it was charged that the people
were being forced to send their children to mosque schools. In 1991
a revolt began over the attempted enforcement of the policy of
family planning (which had been promoted, at least in posters, from
1985) to the minorities. The Uighur were supposed to be limited to
four children instead of the Chinese standard of one. In China, as a
norm, many policies are announced but not enforced; in fact there is
a lot of "live and let live" accomodation in the provinces.
What this record tells us is that there have been a number of
revolts over large areas and for a variety of causes. The Chinese
have a contradictory nationalities policy, calling for "flexibility"
and usually allowing local authorities to avoid Beijing's directives
by one means or another. In the 1950s there was a liberal party
secretary in Xinjiang (Yang En-lo). He was an ex-military man and
reasonably tolerated by the ethnic minorities. Secretary Yang openly
resisted the policies of the Cultural Revolution and threatened to
seize the nuclear testing site at Lop Nor unless they left him alone.
Eventually, the was purged in the Cultural Revolution and a Uighur
party secretary (who had been educated in the USSR) was installed.
But in 1978 the liberal secretary Yang was brought back to power.
What does this recent history tell us relevant to the new
situation following the collapse of the USSR? If the Soviets are no
longer a threat, does this mean that the Chinese will be able to do
whatever they wish in Xinjiang? In fact, this Is not so.
The entire situation was changed by Deng himself in 1978 when
Beijing came out in favor of decentralization, especially in the
economy. This reversed the Maoist policy of redistribution of
wealth In which the rich provinces subsidized the poorer
ones.. ..basically, the east subsidizing the west. But the policies of
equalization were bad for rapidly increasing the GNP. After 1978 the
decentralization of investments favored the coastal provinces and
caused their incomes to rise sharply. But Xinjiang did not
experience the same income growth; instead it had to cope with
greater inflation. In fact, the real incomes went down although
there was some nominal income gain on paper. Xinjiang has little
local manufacturing; it ships out raw materials and brings in
manufactured goods. If was forced to sell its raw materials for
whatever it could get. Not unnaturally, the provincials view this as
exploitation. Poor provinces, not only Xinjiang, bitterly complained,
but were told by Beijing that this was only temporary.
In 1984-85, as relations with the USSR improved somewhat, the
poor provinces were granted a form of relief by being encouraged to
trade across international borders. ...Xinjiang with Soviet Central
Asia, Tibet with Nepal, etc. Trade did increase rapidly and Xinjiang
sought Middle Eastern investment from the Saudis and Turkey. The
Haj was also opened. As part of this trade, there was a considerable
amount of arms smuggling from Afghanistan, Soviet Central Asia and
Pakistan. Much of the trade was by Muslims, including caravans,
trucks and railroad. It was difficult to control an area as large as
Xinjiang and impossible to check every truck or raiiraod car without
destroying the economic benefit of the new trading policy.
The internal situation of the Chinese military makes it difficult
to reverse the current trends. The PLA is reluctant to take action
agianst any demonstrations anywhere. The armies are becoming
more regionalized and less willing to take orders from the central
government. Even the finances of the army are becoming
regionalized. As a result, it would be difficult for Beijing to order
the army into action if, hypothetically, they wished to move the
Guangdong forces against Hong Kong.
Stephen Blank : Does the military have large local reserves?
June Teufel Drever : The reserves are really provincial as well. What
we are seeing in Xinjiang is not yet a true "autonomous" republic, but
the trends are clearly towards looser control. The Beijing
government is genuinely worried about whole provinces, not just
local revolts. The state sector in China is now smaller than the
private sector. There have been waves of strikes and even sabotage
against state enterprises. The whole command structure is
deteriorating. Clandestine trade unions appear and there is even a
resurgence of the clan and the secret society organizations of the
pre-1949 period. Some of these in Yunnan are now engaged in drug-
running across the international borders.
Stephen Blank : We see some similar things in the new Central Asian
states. There, the local communist parties (some renamed, of
course) have a basis in local clans and regional interests. Nabeyev
was kept in power in Tajikistan largely to appease the northern
areas that are the center of his power base.
June Teufel Drever : Xinjiang has gold and has allowed local
entrepreneurs to exploit it. A large number of the "floating
population" joined in the gold rush. It is estimated that at least 70
percent of the revenue never appears officially. As the local party
organizations are taken over by local ethnics they don't answer to a
national constituency. The people usually blamed for inciting
revolts are the Hui, the ethnic Chinese Muslims, leading to the
saying: "The white hats (Hui) are inciting the flower hats (Uighur) to
rebellion, but the big hats (Han) win." The moral of the story being
that the Uighur get hurt.
Eden Nabv : Today there are about a million Kazakhs in Xinjiang. It
would have to be Kazakhs, Uighur and Hui to come together on a basis
of Muslim identity to pose a threat to Kazakhstan.
Stephen Blank : The Chinese are not as interested in the area as are
the Russians. Yet, without the oil of Kazakhstan they would not be
interested at all. The communications are very difficult.
Stephen Blank : The Russians clearly don't want instability, thus
they facor the Chinese now. They would be very much against any of
the CIS republics getting involved in the dismantling of China.
Graham Fuller : Clearly, the Central Asian republics cannot control
their own fate. Where would they side in the event of a Russian-
Chinese clash? Now, they have national sovereign governments and
will not act like the old dynastic regimes.
Mikhail Tsypkin : Xinjiang has both nuclear research and development
as well as testing near Lop Nor, but their nuclear assembly is done
8next door in Ningxia province.
Graham Fuller : What could happen in the case of a new regime in
Beijing? Could there be major rebellions and true separatism?
June Teufel Drever : The problem with the "new regime" scenario is
that the old regime doesn't all die off at once. There are some
leaders in their 60s and 70s, not just in their 80s. Behind them are
a number of younger sons. One of this "prince" faction is already
holding the governorship in Guangdong, where he has the additional
local tie of being from the Hakka minority. The party and Beijing
could slide into Irrelevance.
Siddleq Noorzov: For the long term, we have to look at the fact that
the private sector is now superior. This means that the economic
basis of the communist state is declining.
Graham Fuller: The ethnic makeup of XInjinag is still a matter of
dispute over the reliability of the statistics. Could this prevent a
break-away?
The population is usually given as 16 million. Clearly, there is a
non-Han majority, but the Han would probably outnumber the UIghur
population alone.
CENTRAL ASIA AS VIEWED BY RUSSIA
Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College
There are two general aspects to examine in the view of Central
Asia from Moscow: Russian relations with the Middle East and
ethnic conflicts within the former USSR. We will focus on defense
and security issues. Basic to this is the emergence of the CIS into
full-fledged statehood, with consequences that are impossible to
project. There is no longer an Anglo-Russian "Great Game", as in the
19th century, but much more of a multi-lateral competion with the
Central Asian states both as agents and objects of other powers,
including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, Turkey and perhaps
even Afghanistan. One party is certainly the United States in
particular and the West in general.
This competition takes various forms. In Washington, the only
alternative to the CIS is considered to the Iran. The view is that
this will happen unless the West, especially Turkey, get involved.
Lacking this, they will all become clones or at least satellites of
Iran.
My own view is that this is very wrong and demonstrates no
feeling for the local conditions or understanding of Islam. There are
multiple identities in Central Asia, Le^, Muslims, Shia, Sunni, Turks,
Iranians etc. There is not a specifically Iranian identification and
the defeat of Iran in the war with Iraq has demonstrated that the
revolutionary Islam from Iran doesn't travel well.
India is especially active in Kyrgyzia and Kazakhstan. It is very
concerned over a monolithic Islamic bloc. India, like the old USSR,
is a multi-ethnic secular state. Thus, the events so far have clearly
helped Pakistan. India hopes to counter this by getting in on the
ground floor with economic and technological benefits. In this they
are following the traditional strategy of the British Raj in trying to
deny the northwest frontier to a hostile power. This implies an
active Indian policy in Afghanistan as well.
Pakistan wants to cement more ties with Central Asia to create a
kind of influence and camaraderie. They also seek to develop
overland transport routes, both via China and Afghanistan.
The Iranians wish to develop religious, cultural, economic and
energy ties, but even in Tajikistan their policy has been very
cautious. They are not trying to overthrow governments or to
interfere in border areas. There is a faction that feels it is their
duty to provide aid to Muslim elements. There was a severe press
attack by the radicals, led by former deputy foreign minister
Larijani, against government caution. At the recent meeting
between Velayati and the Indian foreign minister a joint statement
spoke of the need to find an honorable solution to the worsening
plight of the world's Muslims. Iran is looking out for security the
Gulf and traditional Iranian interests. It feels threatened and is not
offensive in its orientation. This might be called into question by
its $14 billion arms acquisition plan over five years. The situation
between Armenia and Azerbaijan becomes more difficult for both
Iran and Turkey the longer it persists.
Turkey has taken the lead in sponsoring the modernization of the
Central Asian states, but is now finding that it might be going too
far. It is under pressure from events in Azerbaijan and Bosnia and is
at the limit of its economic resources. They also are not going to
sacrifice current good relations with Moscow. Now, they want to
secure a beachhead in Central Asia.
The Central Asian republics are very divided:
I) The economic subsidies and trade links still make them very
dependent on Russia.
2) We can see the beginnings of full sovereignty including armed
forces. For now, they can't afford a large military, but by the end of
the decade they could have genuine armies.
3) For now, they are all dependent for their security on Russia.
However, all are eager to court anyone able to do business and to
diversify their ties to such countries as China, India, Israel, the
Saudis, and the United States (as seen in the deal between Chevron
and Kazakhstan).
It is hard to see Russia being satisfied with its much diminished
size, especially when there is a Russian diaspora of between 25 and
30 million people. This could create a climate for renewed
imperialism with demands for their "humanitarian" right to
intervene to protect the Russians. This could lead to a repeat of the
1920s and 1930s, where the protection of co-ethnics, whether
Germans, Slavs, Poles, etc. resulted in conflict in Eastern Europe.
The Central Asians, at least the governments, don't want to see
the Russians leave as their economies are too dependent on their
skills. Russia has pledged to defend them militarily if necessary,
but the state of the army is so poor that it is questionable if it
could go into action to suppress ethnic conflicts. If it does, it will
probably mean the end of the current liberalism in Russia. Thus, the
main goal of the Yeltsin government is stabilization. Even beyond
their territorial borders they seek to reopen their role in the Persian
Gulf. Foreign Minister Kozyrev in his recent tour of the Gulf made a
clear effort to set out an independent position for Russia in the
Middle East. In the Arab-Israeli conflict they want good relations
with both sides and there is talk of them selling arms to the
Israelis. They have associated themselves in the U.S.-sponsored
talks, but might pursue their own aims there as well. In the Gulf, it
is clear that they want good relations with all, but Kozyrev made it
clear that Russia regards Iran as the key. They see Iran as a
"normal" state and hope to promote cooperation, but this does not
preclude cooperation with Iraq as well if it reforms its behavior.
Even though Central Asians have tried to warn Russia that Iran could
be a threat, they don't see it In that light. Relations with Iran have
continued arms sales at a very high rate, including three submarines,
SU 27s and tanks. These sales could give Iran the capability of
interdicting the Gulf, even against the United States. They are
willing to sell to all parties and hope not to have to choose sides. A
political aim in this policy is to get others to endorse the integrity
of Russia (possibly, versus Tatar, Chechen and other Muslim claims).
For both Russia and Iran the other is their most favored nation.
This can lead to tension with the United States, which doesn't view
Iran as a "normal" state.
I don't see the Iranian "model" being followed in Central Asia.
Their elites have a good deal of experience in the handling of
religion. They are all faced with domestic problems. Finally, multi-
lateral competition will work to contain Iranian domination.
Siddieq Noorzov : The subsidies from the center to the republics are
notoriously difficult to quantify.. .under the old system it was
impossible to tell. We don't see today that these are in cash. Are
they in materials? Have they been deliberately concealed?
Graham Fuller : There are inefficient industries that are subsidized,
but these are being cut. Energy is very important, and Yeltsin has
suspended the freeing of energy to the market.
Eden Nabv : Are the energy subsidies continuing? Certainly, they are
paying for defense. Transportation has now been divided up,
including Aeroflot.
Stephen Blank : Agriculture has not yet been freed. Subsidies are
still intact.
Graham Fuller : There is a new military situation. The republics are
paying for their own internal defense needs.
Eden Nabv : There were heavy subsidies from Moscow, but these have
now gone. Even in the USSR, there were local cries of exploitation
by the system. The center did pay a high price for cotton and kept
food prices low.
Siddieq Noorzov : Production was subsidized throughout the USSR.
This did not mean that these were being given directly to the
republics.
Eden Nabv : Can Russia pay subsidies to maintain the status quo? Or
do they wish to create economic dependencies? Do they really want
to help them develop as viable independent states? We see in the
Baltics and Ukraine many economic and military problems making it
difficult to let them go. .OThere is ambivalence in the Central Asian
states, as Azerbaijan now says that it wants out of the CIS
completely. The very purpose of the Russian state has been
imperialism and they will try to expand to their 1921 borders.
Stephen Blank : When Russia recovers its nerve, it will attempt to
dominate, although not necessarily militarily. They can't maintain
8themselves in their current borders.
Graham Fuller : With their southern borders of Central Asia open to
free access, these states will be at least as heavily oriented
towards the south. It is doubtful if the old orientation towards the
north can be restored; perhaps there will something like a British
Commonwealth.
Stephen Blank : They all agree that they don't want anybody to
dominate and the foreign influences will act to cancel each other
out.
Graham Fuller : There is ambivalence on the part of people in the
region because Russia under certain circumstances could be useful
in coming in to defend them. But it is at least as likely that Russian
troops would come in to secure their own interest or to play sides
against one or the other. Thus you see all of them intensely
interested in creating their own security forces.
Stephen Blank : Yes, but they can't afford it.
Graham Fuller : They will make it their top priority, at any costs.
It is a very high priority. This is one of the reasons why Azerbaijan
wants out now. They are not sure one what side the CIS forces
would support, Azerbaijan or Armenia.
Stephen Blank : The head of the Oriental Institute of Moscow at a
talk two weeks ago at the Institute for Defense Analysis mentioned
that Armenian nationalists were working with tribes in the area of
Nagorno-Karabakh trying to detach parts of Azerbaijan. There is a
collective security treaty between Russia and the other republics of
the CIS, but Russia has made it clear to Armenia that they don't
want to send troops if Armenia is attacked by Turkey. Marshal
Shaposhnikov has said that this could lead to a world war. Turkey is
a NATO ally. They also believe the Armenians have brought it on
themselves. And third, bringing the army back Into action for this
purpose means the end of Yeltsin's liberal reform policy. If it has to
be reconstituted as a real fighting force to fight foreigners who are
attacking the CIS, or in defending Russians abroad, this would
necessitate restoring the military-industrial complex. It doesn't
have to be an autocratic action, but these industries have to be very
heavily subsidized. These might even be officially "private
industries".
Eden Nabv : Why is that a threat to Yeltsin's democracy?
Stephen Blank : Historically, the greatest enemy of democracy in
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Russia is the army.
Eden Nabv : It could do a lot to revive the Russian economy.
Stephen Blank : Yes, but under whose auspicies?
Graham Fuller: I think your argument was valid at an earlier period
when the democrats said that if we try to keep the empire by force
it will be by autocratic means, but I'm not sure if that follows
today.
Claude Buss : It did not follow in the British Empire.
Stephen Blank : The British Empire has a very different history than
the Russian. Historically, every attempt at reform in Russia has
faltered over the nationalities issue. The Decemberists couldn't
work with the Poles. It continued through the Soviet revolution,
which tried to maintain the Russian empire territorially. The
attempt to use the Russian (or CIS) army to intervene where
Russians are threatened means the destruction of any notion that
these territories are sovereign states. It will unite the population
around the nationalist alternative. If it is Yeltsin, it won't be a
liberal Yeltsin.
Eden Nabv : But that is different to coming to the aid of Armenia
against Turkey, for instance.
nStephen Blank : Azerbaijan is a member of the CIS, yet it feels under
threat and feels that the security treaty is worthless. No one is
going to defend them. When they asked Yeltsin if the CIS could
defend them, he answered that he wants to get the army out of the
trans-Caucasus as soon as he can. Armenia is now much better
armed and organized than Azerbaijan, so Azerbaijan looks at this
treaty and says it want to get out.
Graham Fuller : There is also the problem of the presence of Russian
troops seen as preserving the status of the old style nomenklatura.
This is another grounds for local nationalists in not wanting Russian
troops.
Stephen Blank : There is an article in The Journal of Soviet Military
Studies (No. 2, 1992) by a CIA analyst. He writes about operation
"Ring" in Azerbaijan and the Black Berets in Azerbaijan. Up to 1991
the Soviet goverment under Gorbachev, with Kryuchkov and Yazov
taking the lead, sent in Russian troops to maintain both Nagorno-
Karabakh, keep the old regime of Mutalibov in power and suppress
the reform movement in Azerbaijan to prevent it from leaving the
union. They moved into these areas with Azerbaijan troops,
committed atrocities and tried to expel Armenians. This collapsed
12
due to Armenian resistance and to the failure of the coup in Moscow.
Now the reformers have come to power in Baku. The Russian army
was not happy about being used in this situation and is trying to get
out of it. The Armenians who organized and resisted are now
advancing, which has created Azerbaijan's internal strife.
Edward Olsen : Why would you call the struggle today a new "Great
Game". The essence the old great game was that there were great
powers engaged. Today you find that the remaining great powers,
perhaps the United States and Japan, are not directly engaged.
Stephen Blank : The Japanese are certainly interested. But I want to
focus on the metaphor of the game, rather than on the "great" clash
of empires. What we have is the fact that outside powers are
attempting to expand their influence into a third state. What we
have is the competion between India, Pakistan, China, Turkey, etc.
Stephen Pelletiere : What you do when you use a term like "the Great
Game" is that you create a mental image that things are being
orchestrated and run by someone to a purpose. In point of fact, you
have a chaotic situation in which things are happening and changing
from one day to the next.
Ralph Magnus : Could it be a balance of power?
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Stephen Blank : It is not a balance of power, but there is an attempt
to create an order.
Eden Nabv : What you have is a vacuum that everyone is attempting to
fill.
Graham Fuller : These are states that were essentially without
normal geopolitical orientations that are in the process of finding
these orientations,
Stephen Blank : The acquisition of a geopolitical orientation is a
tortuous process complicated by outside involvement and
competition.
Stephen Peiletiere : Is that the main thing that is going on, or is it
the main thing the fact that these entities are trying to define
themselves?
Eden Nabv : What this conference is about is to try to see if there are
border issues in this process. I would like to ask if you think there
are border issues involved in northern Kazakhstan?
Stephen Blank : I think this is just what worries the Kazakh
government. There are forces in Russia that want to detach northern
Kazakhstan. This area is heavily Russian and the most industrialized
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part of the republic. Solzenitsyn in his pamphlet openly calls for
this. Demographically, Kazakhstan is balanced, about 40 percent
Kazakh and 40 percent Russian, and Nazerbayev is attempting with
great skill to keep everybody happy and to prevent these questions
from being brought up. This is why he wants to stay in the CIS... to
stabilize it and make it work. If this question is raised, and I am
afraid it will be (partially dependent on the outcome of the Crimea,
where there is a plebiscite scheduled for August 2nd), all hell will
break out. This would effectively undermine the basis for the CIS
and for the Central Asian republics staying In the CIS. If their
republic borders can not be guaranteed, it makes Russia a threat.
The CIS stands or falls on the perception that Russia is no longer a
threat. The moment that it starts raising border issues the notion
that the CIS represents something new in Russian history collapses.
All these peoples will feel threatened and will start looking for an
alternative.
Eden Nabv : But the Crimean situation will bring all that up soon.
Stephen Blank : It depends on how that situation is resolved. I
expect the plebiscite to vote for Russia, but what happens then?
The Ukraine could say that they would give a lot of autonomy as long
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as you stay in the Ukraine. The Ukraine, as I see it, is trying to get
out of the CIS, because Yeltsin in August 1991 raised the issue of
borders. All of these borders are not strictly international borders;
to raise these things is to threaten the status quo of a very fragile
state system.
Lewis Madden : Is there any evidence of the return of the Russian
diaspora?
Stephen Blank : Russians from Central Asia are returning to Russia,
although the local governments are trying to keep them there for
good economic and political reasons. I have not seen Ukrainians in
Central Asia. A lot of evidence suggests that Ukrainians outside of
the Ukraine assimilated into a larger Russian culture. This was part
of Stalin's objective. I don't know if they count themselves as
Russians or Ukrainians.
Eden Nabv: They are listed for demographic purposes as Ukrainians.
Stephen Blank : They are functionally Slavs, but what do they see
themselves...
Eden Nabv : They see themselves as Ukrainians, but whether there is
a movement to return is uncertain.
Lewis Madden : They might want to return because they have a little
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better situation to return to.
Stephen Blank : A lot of Ukrainians intermarried with Russians. It is
a common situation.
Graham Fuller : Most Russians are getting nervous; a lot of people
are leaving and Moscow has accepted this as a fait accompli. Unless
there are Russians being slaughtered in the streets of Central Asia
the Russians would be extremely hard put to do anything. The big
problem for the Russians is finding places to put all of them.
Although the Central Asian leaders talk a good line that they want to
keep them, they also need to have them gone. ..there is the question of
housing and jobs, for instance.
Stephen Blank : They need to have them gone, but they would like
them to go quietly and without panic.
Eden Nabv : In some cases there is panic already.
Graham Fuller : I don't think that these overseas Russians are going
to be the instrument for the extension of Russian power.
Stephen Blank : I wouldn't say they're the instrument; they are the
pretext.
Graham Fuller : The idea that the Red Army, or whatever you call It,
is going to come in and take it over all again is to my mind
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inconceivable.
Lewis Madden : How could they not support the Russians if they were
being abused. Politically, Yeltsin could not abandon these people.
Stephen Blank : It is clear that Yeltsin is adopting an increasingly
tough line on these issues. They won't even give back the Kurile
islands to Japan for fear of arousing nationalist opposition. If there
is a real threat to Russian people, so far this has not happened in
Central Asia, the government will have to take some action. This
will not have to be military action.
Eden Nabv : There are two other issues involved here. There are
certain parts of the old Soviet Union where Moscow could and would
act more easily. Central Asia has a much lower priority for that list
than in the west. There is another fact in Central Asia. This is that
the international borders of Central Asia, whether towards China or
to the south, are guarded by non-ethnic military forces. In the case
of Tajikistan there is a very heavy presence of Russians in the
border areas of Badakhshan with China and Afghanistan. This
military is not leaving and they are quite happy to stay. They could
respond to a threat to other ethnic Russians.
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Stephen Blank : It depends on the threat to Russians. No one is
threatening them today.
Siddieo Noorzov : All of these governments are basically the old
party regimes. They are all facing democratic and indigenous
movements that could make life miserable for the Slavs.
Stephen Blank : If that came to pass, the Russian government would
have to start doing things politically to protest that. We see that
they are taking a very tough diplomatic line against the Baltic
states. In Moldova they have resorted to force. An actual physical
threat to Russians will force the Yeltsin government to take action
in order to maintain itself.
Graham Fuller : I think a little terrorism goes a long way. But I
could see the scattered Russians being concentrated in capitals
prior to evacuation and the Russian military intervening to secure
this.
Stephen Pelletiere : The focus seems to be on the way it was and the
assumption is that it is going back to the way it was. It won't be
exactly the same, but it will look like what it was before the whole
thing fell apart.
In fact, we may be missing the boat completely. It won't go back the
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way it was and we need to look at what is happening on the ground
without putting interpretations on it.
Stephen Blank : I have been trying to make the point that Central
Asia will maintain its independence if it can successfully
multilateralize its development and play this game to its advantage.
There is a trend towards greater association of the five republics
and perhaps a broader organization.
I also think that Russia is once again, however, going to try to
establish a political connection. It won't necessarily look like the
Tsarist empire, but I'm certain that some kind political and defense
arrangement will be worked out with the Central Asian republics.
Eden Nabv : But you have to see why they went into Central Asia and
why they would want to do it again. They went into Central Asia
specifically because of British advances in South Asia. If Central
Asia can be maintained as a buffer between China and Russia,
because South Asia is certainly no longer a threat, it could serve
Russian security.
Stephen Blank: I disagree with you. They didn't go into Central Asia
because the British were in India. They went in because they were
an imperial state, the territory was there, and the states were
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weak. The British were thousands of miles away. They might have
been a justification, however.
Mikhail Tsvpkin : I have a more general question. What is the value
of history in trying to forcast current events? I admit I constantly
overuse history. You can always find something in history; its just
like quoting Lenin. Maybe they lost their imperialist instinct. What
if something has changed in their political development?
Stephen Blank : I think a lot has changed, but I also remember that
historically the liberals were always good nationalists and patriots
in Russia. I read all these wonderful statements that the Black Sea
Fleet is a strategic asset that defends the CIS. That is a reasonable
arguement. Then Yeltsin makes a speech in Novorossiysk saying that
the Black Sea Fleet is Russian, was Russian and will be Russian.
That kind of thinking makes me suspect that they haven't kicked the
imperialist habit. If something happens to arouse them through
threats to Russian people in these areas, then actions will be taken.
They may not be military actions; they may evacuate the Russians. I
find it difficult as a historian to accept that the Russian government
and people will settle for their boundries. The Ukraine is the
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window on Europe. Central Asia was taken because it was there and
Russia was an expansionist power with very few obstacles in its
path. I'm not sure what happened overturned this. What really
happened was that you had a failed coup which opened the way to the
new government. You didn't have a revolution, although it was a
revolutionary situation. There are a lot of people around Yeltsin, and
perhaps Yeltsin himself, who are not immune to this kind of thinking.
Can they really accept the consequences of the new geopolitical
situation, as Graham said? It going to be very hard for them to let
Central Asia go its own way.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BREAK-UP OF IRAQ
Stephen C. Pelletiere, U.S. Army War College
There is an Arab dimension to the problems of Central Asian
borders as well as Russian and Chinese dimensions. The Kurds are
definitely part of Central Asia and they are part of the Arab world
as well. Were they to create a separate state in northern Iraq is
would have severe implications for the Arab world. It would finish
Arab nationalism (even though some think it is already dead). The
Israelis would not have to worry about any threat or check from the
Arabs because the Egyptians have already left the struggle. Syria
was never a genuine threat to the Israelis. The only current real
threat to Israel is Iraq.
Eden Nabv : I would disagree with the characterization of the Kurds
as part of Central Asia, however they are very important to the
border issues there.
Stephen Pelletiere : I will try to explain how I feel they are part of
the picture. They are a link between Central Asian and Arab politics.
If you leave the Kurdish situation out you also leave a major factor
in United States security concerns in the region. How are they part
of Central Asia?
If you are including the Azerbaijanis as part of the Central Asian
region, you have to include the Kurds. There is a long and close
connection between the Azeris and the Kurds. They were two break
away regions setting up "independent republics" in Iran in 1945.
Part of the area claimed by the Azeribaijanis is also claimed by the
Kurds as well. The Kurds have a long history of cooperation with the
Armenians in the pursuit of common goals.
At the end of World War I, they both wished for their republics to be
established from the remains of the Ottoman empire, and these were
promised in the abortive peace treaty of Sevres, which was then
overturned by the treaty of Lausanne following the victory of the
Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Kemal Ataturk). As
recently as the 1980s the Kurdish terrorists affiliated with the PPK
cooperated with the Armenians to assassinate Turkish diplomats.
Both were based in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.
One of the concerns discussed earlier was the Turkish reaction
should the Azeris find themselves loosing a conflict to the
Armenians. It would be very difficult for them to stand by and do
nothing. What, then, would be the position of the Turkish goverment
should the one-third of Anatolia in the southeast of Turkey break
away to join their Kurdish brothers in Iraq?
Stephen Blank : Both Graham Fuller and I feel that the Turkish
leaders are being subject to an intense crisis all the way from
Bosnia to Alma Ata.
Stephen Pelletiere : You also have to speculate what the Iranians
would do if an independent Kurdish state was established in northern
Iraq and there was an attempt by the Turkish Kurds to associate
themselves with it. There are about 4 million Iranian Kurds. They
had a nationalist movement that was crushed by the Iranians in 1983.
We may assume that this would revive and, indeed, may see its
revival now in reaction to events in northern Iraq. The Kurds can go
back and forth across borders with ease.
Graham Fuller : It is a question if there is not now an independent
Kurdish entity in Iraq, especially with the holding of elections there.
Stephen Blank : In a broader perspective, it is a fact that due to the
recent events such as the Gulf War, the collapse of the USSR, and the
revived Arab-Israeli peace proces the dimensions of the Middle East
are no longer what they were. Central Asia is part of this expanded
Middle East. The creation of a new state could upset the equilibrium
of existing states causing a chain reaction throughout the region.
Stephen Pelletiere : I agree. There is another aspect in the effect on
Syria, were there suddenly to be no Iraq. Would they not open their
doors to the surviving Iraqi Baathists?
Stephen Blank : Can the Kurds by themselves create a state?
Stephen Pelletiere : No, they can't. Someone has to give it to them.
The Arabs view this as a plot. It is an attempt by the West to
remove the Arab nation as a factor in world politics. I tend to agree
with this, even though its dangerous to go along with conspiracy
theories. At least, if not a conspiracy, there is a tendency on the
part of certain interests to exploit certain situations. In the history
of the Kurdish issue, certain interests have always been involved
with them, particularly the Israelis, the British and the Iranians.
Eden Nabv : Which Arab view are you talking about; is this the Saudi
view?
Stephen Pelletiere : No, I know that the Saudis are now supporting it
at the moment; they are supporting a position that could lead to the
break up of Iraq. I'm talking about Arab intellectuals. They feel that
the Kurds are always manipulated by outsiders. We tend to look on it
as a human rights issue.
Lewis Madden : To draw an analogy to the creation of Israel, do you
think that the creation of a Kurdish state may serve as a pretext for
the unification of the states around it?
Stephen Pelletiere : I don't think so, because you would have the
banding of three peoples, Iranians, Turks and Arabs, who have no
particular reason for getting together, whereas the Arabs around
Israel did all feel themselves as Arabs. There appears to me to be a
campaign now in the United States, mainly in the media, with the
aim of creating a Kurdish state to hurt Iraq. There are varying
degrees of this. Some feel that helping the Kurds would not lead to
the breakup of Iraq. Others are vaguely aware that a Kurdish
state would bring into question the future viability of Iraq, but they
don't want to deal with it. Then there are those who know very well
that this would result in the collapse of Iraq, and this is what they
want.
Graham Fuller : There is, perhaps, a forth point of view. That is that
it is just the nature of the issue, which is going to come about
anyway.
Stephen Pelletiere : I see articles in the press, television programs,
and moves in Congress for the United States to take certain actions
which, I believe, would inevitably lead to us taking miliatary action
in Iraq. It seems to me, as a former professional journalist, that
this kind of campaign has some kind of direction. The same thing
happened at the end of Iran-Iraq war. If we keep up the kind of
pressure we have on Iraq now, If the Saudis continue to give money
to the Kurds to keep the movement going on, if we continue to pay
off the Turks to allow our planes in Turkey to secure northern Iraq,
ultimately the Iraqi regime will collapse.
The next question Is what would be the consequences of this?
The Iraqi Baath Party is the best organized party in the Arab world.
With them you find an individual who Is primarily Identified by his
Baathist commitment and career. Perhaps they are identified with
It more as a corporate environment and culture than as an ideology.
They have a great respect for a scientific and organizational method.
The results are showing in the success of the regime In rebuilding
the country under very stressful conditions. This could not be done
without effective and dedicated Baathists. Were Saddam Hussein to
be removed the Baath would not survive, because the conditions
causing his removal would mean that we would be In a position to
dictate his successor, or at least have a veto. If we were to do this,
the Baath Party would fall apart. All the leading Baathist are the
same. Rahmadan, Ibrahim, Aziz, Majid, etc. are the same as Saddam.
Eden Nabv : But if the party is so effective a socializing agent, why
is is necessary that if the head is removed the whole party must
fall?
Stephen Pelletiere : The only way to remove Saddam would be at the
dictation of the United States, and this would cause the party to
loose all of its intensity and coherence. If they were to decide on
their own to remove Saddam as a liability, the party could survive.
But any one the party would put in by themselves would be
unacceptable to us, because they would be little different from
Saddam. The ones foremost in this campaign want the destruction of
the Baath Party, not just of Saddam Hussein. I put much less weight
on the power of the Takritis and more on the characteristics of the
party as a highly organized and centralized force. It is something of
a unique feature in Arab political parties. Their "scientific
methods" are best described as a tendency to look for formulas that
will yield good results in certain situations, rather than operating
on an ad hoc basis. They work out in advance their doctrine, goals
8and methods. Given the character of the party, there is a good
argument that the destruction of the party means that the country
falls apart. This is complemented by an examination of the history
of Iraq before the Baath came to power. It was closely approaching
anarchy before they appeared. They were always difficult to govern,
certainly under the monarchy. There were terrible riots in Kirkuk
and Mosul after the monarchy was overthrown. The Iraqis were
noted in the Middle East for their violent and ungovernable behavior.
Thus, a large part of the success of the Baath was that their rule
gave a relief from anarchy. One reason the Iranian regime never had
much appeal to the Iraqis is that they saw and recognized the
internal conflicts in the early years of the Islamic republic. Were
the Baath to disappear the various groups would quickly slide back
into anarchy.
To elaborate on this theme, I suggest the following scenario of
the likely consequences stemming from an independent Kurdistan
breaking away from Iraq. The Baath would become so weakened as to
loose its grip and Iraq would fall apart. The Iranians would invade
the south, even though they would not be welcomed, even by the Iraqi
Shia. Until the late 1960s this part of Iraq was essentially
controlled by the Iranians. There were many Iranian residents, they
supported the shrines and the economy. During the war, there were
many attempts to seize Basra. As soon as that happens the Turks
will take Mosul. This is part of their record. They feel they lost
Mosul after World War I by British tricks. Presently, the Turks are
under severe constraints on their action, but these would disappear
should the Iranians move into the south. They could justify
themselves before world opinion. They would also not allow the
Kurds to hold the Kirkuk oil fields.
United States security would be effected. The two countries
would each have major oil fields and both would be hawks within
OPEC, because they are both developing states that need the money.
I don't think the United States could afford to see the Saudis loose
control of OPEC, because their oil policies agree with those of the
United States.
Siddieq Noorzov : Why would that situation you project be any
different from what we have now? Both Iran and Iraq are already in
OPEC and they are both already hawks on princing.
Stephen Pelletiere : The difference is that since the late war, Saudi
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Arabia clearly dominates OPEC by its own market share. It naturally
wants what is best for it and this happens to be what is best for us,
that is to keep oil around 17 to 18 dollars. This might also lead to
clashes between Iran and Turkey. The United States would not be in
any position to defend the oil fields. We may pull CENTCOM out or
even break it up and absorb it in the European command. The Iranians
would be in effective control. There would be constant cross border
conflicts, raids, etc. This is the factor most important to the
United States is the very real threat to us. What is now going on in
Washington is a major factor, the essential factor, in bringing this
about the undermining of Iraq.
Ralph Magnus : If this is the case, why do you think that the Saudis
are seemingly acting against their own best interests in supporting
such an outcome?
Stephen Pelletiere : I don't really understand It. I heard two things
on my recent trip to Riyadh. One was that the Saudis were
extremely anti-Jordanian because the their historic emnity with
the Hashemites. Thus, they are challenging the Hashemite control
over the Dome of the Rock. Also, It make no sense that they have cut
off support to the Palestinians. Even if they have a real grievance,
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they have to realize that their best interests are in creating
stability. The PLO, however, clearly has the capacity to make
trouble. Recently, the Saudis appear to be giving large sums to the
Talabani Kurds, who are adamantly opposed to a deal with Saddam.
They also received the Iraqi Shia leader Bakr al-Hakim, long in exile
in Iran. I can only feel that we have been crediting them with more
sense than they possess.
Stephen Blank : As an agreement between the Arabs and Israelis
becomes more feasible, this Saudi policy is a way of establishing
themselves in the equation vis-a -vis both the Jordanians and
Palestinians.
Kamil Said : What is the place of the London based Iraqi opposition.
We have a lot of contacts with them. They have a lot of contacts
with Iranian based opposition and with the Iraqi army.
Graham Fuller : I think it is interesting that there is an Iraqi
opposition now. Whether they can come to power in Baghdad or not
is a different matter, and probably highly dubious. Yet there is
something new. They have been able to meet with each other as they
never have before, and there are something like fifty opposition
newspapers. There is more substantive discussion among them than
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ever about the future of Iraq. It is not all negative.
Eden Nabv: What is the alternative to not allowing a Kurdish state to
come into being? The problem is not going to go away.
Stephen Pelletiere : In effect, the Kurds do "go away". If you look at
their record, they always attack when there is an opportunity for a
victory. As soon as the situation becomes untenable, they come to
terms at least temporarily.
Eden Nabv : But there is an ethnic problem in Iraq that keeps coming
up.
Graham Fuller : I think that you fail to acknowledge any process of
historical evolution in nationalism. Look at the evolution of
Palestinian nationalism, for instance.
Stephen Pelletiere : There is no significant development of a
nationalist movement. That is not to say that they don't have a
strong feeling for the existence of a Kurdish nation and what It
means to be a Kurd. They are still in the "clan" stage of
development. What is the Kurdish movement today? It Is the KDP
(Kurdish Democratic Party) which is essentially the Barzani tribe.
They are in a constant nomadic quest to get back their land. Then
you have the PUK (Popular Union of Kurdistan), which is essentially
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Jelal Talabani, who has no tribal associations and no real base.
However, he has good international contacts and serves as their
international representative from his base in London. Beyond this,
they have a lot of unemployed Kurds who will enlist in the Pesh
Merga to get money.
Eden Nabv: This does not mean that there is not a large Kurdish
minority in Iraq that will always be a sorepoint.
Stephen Blank : If politics is the art of the possible, we have to
acknowledge that there are some problems beyond political solution
because they are impossible to solve. We can only hope to manage
them.
Graham Fuller: I support the view that we have two price hawks in
Iran and Iraq, but beyond that there has never been anyone in the
region who wanted to cut off oil.
Stephen Pelletiere : The world economy is so interdependent that it
doesn't take much to set off panics in the oil and financial markets.
Graham Fuller : We had the major interruption of the market in the
war and the continued removal of Iraq as an exporter, and nothing
has happened.
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Stephen Pelletiere : This is because the Saudis had a tremendous
increase in their production, and they are now aiming to increase
their capacity even more. This buffered the market.
Mikhail Tsvpkin : Does this mean that we should facilitate the
Russian and CIS in Its efforts to increase production of oil?
Stephen Pelletiere : As a non-economist, I don't know. But this is
something that Russian specialists should think about. There is a
real possibility of the disruption of Middle Eastern production.
June Teufel Drever : How much initiative do we have now? We have
taken a couple of initial steps toward the formation of a Kurdish
state-supporting the elections, etc. President Bush has been under
heavy fire for abandoning the Kurds a year ago. He will find it hard
to do this again in an election year. The Saudis seem to want to get
rid of Saddam Hussein. Everyone seems to agree that the Saudis
cannot play a military role in stabilizing the region. Nobody but the
United States seems capable of this military role, but we are
uncomfortable with it. What do you think can be the United States'
role?
Stephen Pelletiere : I am in the difficult position of trying to work
this out in a study for CENTCOM, but I'm still trying to get my
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thoughts in order. What we have to recognize is that the major new
factor is that of United States hegemony replacing the former
bipolar competition. Then we have to find how we can support this
by military means. There may be a saving grace due to the fact that
we are in an election year, and a lot of what we see in Washington
may be posturing to satisfy certain groups. If Bush wins, he could
back away. If someone else wins, he would have to start from the
begining and Kurdistan probably won't be at the head of the agenda.
We are going to have to pull out of northern Iraq, for Turkey's stake
if nothing else. It is too dangerous for Turkey and it can't go on
forever.
Siddieq Noorzov : My concern about OPEC is that you don't have to
have a political solution of the problem. You could have a cartel of
consumers.
Alternative sources of energy could develop to serve as a threat to
keep the prices stable.
Lewis Madden: Currently the price of oil is low enough and
production elsewhere high enough so the absence of Iraqi production
is not affecting the market. You are assuming the take over of this
production by Turkish and Iranian hawks would push prices up. A
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possible counter to this would be to help increase the production of
the former Soviet fields. We have the industrial capacity as yet
underutilized that could do this. The reports that are coming back
are that the infrastructure in the oil and gas fields are not as bad as
was feared.
Stephen Pelletiere : One of the features of the new hegonomic
system is that we are controlling it to an extent. It could develop in
any of a number of ways. It has been assumed by all Interested
parties that the dependence on the Middle East for oil is a given. If
it were to be put in second place by Russian or CIS oil this would
have a tremendous effect.
Lewis Madden : It will come on line in any case, but given sufficient
incentives it could come on line in about five years.
Mikhail Tsvpkin : Things are moving very slowly there. You have a
system being run by former provincial party secretaries and
assisant professors of Marxism-Leninism. To look at your scenario,
might the impact of hawkishness be upset by the Impact of Iraqi oil
on the market? In the short term, at least, they will have to want to
sell this oil, which currently is not a part of the world supply.
June Teufel Drever : We should not exaggerate the impact of Kazakh
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oil. There are a lot of internal needs as well.
Stephen Pelletiere : You also have to speculate on the effect of oil on
Turkey, which could become a world power. It has the human
resources, but it would then have a viable economy.
Graham Fuller : I see that there is some evolution in the world
regarding nationalism. Even the Kurds are ultimately going to
become more assertive over time. They are eventually destined to
develop their nationalism, probably first in Iraq and perhaps
sweeping into Turkey and Iran as well.
The Shiite majority in Iraq certainly doesn't want to separate
(which is where Washington had it wrong). They are Iraq, and they
want to take it over. They are the majority of the country and are
even about 60-65 % of the population of Baghdad. Neither the
Iranians or anybody else is going to be allowed to take it over.
Stephen Pelletiere : What concerns me is that when you say "not be
allowed", the reality is that we are the people who would have to
stop this, and it would have to be by armed force. You would have
another Lebanon.
Graham Fuller: You might, but the warnings from the United States
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to Iran would be very high that they would not be allowed to do it.
Stephen Pelletiere : I'm sure there would be warnings. But without a
strong central government in Baghdad to get them out, the Iranian
revolutionalry guards would move in as would the Bakr al-Hakim
group.
Graham Fuller: In the long term, the Iraqis might be very lucky In a
democratic, federal state. It is intolerable for the Iraqis to be
condemned to live forever under the Baathi state.
Stephen Pelletiere : At the end of Desert Storm, at the same time we
were appealing to the Iraqi military to overthrow Saddam, we were
appealing to the Kurds to advance their interests. It was self-
defeating.
Graham Fuller : The demographic composition of Iraq makes it likely
that, in the long term, they are not going to be able to keep the Kurds
in by force and, ultimately, the Shiites are going to be running the
state.
Stephen Pelletiere : You are overlooking the fact that during the
Iran-Iraq war the Baath was very successful in moving the Shia
officers up the ladder.
At the end of the war they had at least two corps commanders and
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many division commanders. The army was a vehicle for upward
mobility and the situation of 1980 is no longer the case in the
officer corps. In 1982, when the Iranians almost took Basra and the
Baath held a congress in Baghdad. This congress demonstrated that
there were shifts in the political leadership of the regime. Shias
held the majority of top positions in both the regional command and
the revolutionary command. The assumption that the Shias feel
themselves to be discriminated against by the Sunni Baath
leadership will have to be tested.
Graham Fuller : The Iraqi leadership is terrified of the Shia now;
they fear that they are going to turn on them and kill every last one
of them because they represent the Baath and Saddam Hussein.
There is still a sense of ethnicity and hostility greater than ever
before. We should not confuse Baathi rhetoric with the facts.
Eden Nabv : Isn't this attempt to integrate the Shias into the system
similar to the attempt to integrate the Kurds in the 1970s, which
was a failure?
Stephen Pelletiere : My discovery in studying Iraq has been the
different Interests of the Shia and the Kurds. In part because they
are Arabs, the Shias are susceptible to an argument by the Sunnis on
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the basis of nationalism. There were attempts made to coopt the
Kurds as well. After 1982 the Kurds were not drafted into the Iraqi
army, instead they were organized into local foces. After the end of
Desert Storm, however, they got a better offer from the United
States
Graham Fuller: The argument that a certain number of high positions
are held by Shias or Kurds doesn't mean that the Shias or Kurds
consider the Baathis to be representative of their interest. The
whole of Central Asia Is full of ex-communist apparatchiks who
happen to be ethnics and who are not very highly regarded.
Stephen Pelletiere : This ignores the intensity of the Baathi
indoctinatlon and control process through a series of education and
testing.
Eden Nabv : I wonder whether integration works or not. Look at
Yugoslavia or the creation of "the Soviet man" in Central Asia. They
tried everything. ..education, language reform, economic reform, it
just didn't work.
Ralph Magnus : I have a student now who was born an Egyptian, spent
many years in Iraq working for the Iraqi merchant marine and is now
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a United States Navy officer. He is writing a paper on the
indoctrination of the Iraqi Baathists, quoting many original sources
as well as his contacts and experiences. He was impressed with
what they were doing in creating a new kind of "homo Baathist."
However, in his opinion, they have been corrupted by power, are
overbureaucratized and, versus the old revolutionary generation, are
being taken over by opportunists. These view the party as a joke and
a ticket to getting a good job. If they pay off the right people they
don't have to go to all those silly indoctination classes.
Stephen Pelletiere : I think we do have a problem of the lack of hard
data.
Eden Nabv : I think you have made a good argument for the
preservation of Iraq. But I'm not sure if you are being realistic
about the possibilities for it to continue.
Stephen Pelletiere : I've tried to present a view that I think has been
neglected or not even considered at all.
Siddieq Noorzov : I think it is valid that we should not push the Kurds
any further than they have gone and rather to push them towards
compromise.
There are a number of key issues at stake, including the future of
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Turkey.
But there is a question of how to generate this type of pressure and
how to fine tune the policy to achieve your ends.
Graham Fuller: Another point you made early is an interesting broad
philosophical issue. You stated that the disappearance of Iraq would
mean the final demise of Arab nationalism. I'm increasingly moving
towards the view that the "classic" Arab nationalist movement has
been one of the most destructive features of modern Arab politics. I
don't say this because I'm hostile to all of their goals and merely
want to see them destroyed. It has become a contest among Arab
states to show they are the more authentic Arab nationalist than
their rival, and thus challenge that state's legitimacy. Nasser
worked this game, as did Saddam. In nearly every case it has been
and excuse for dictatorship and brutality. You probably have more
aggressive behavior to their neighbors, and not only their Israeli
neighbor, from these types of regimes. It has meant the death of any
possibility of democratic movements, human rights, civil rights or
stability. All of these are critically necessary to the evolution of a
more normal Middle East. If this is to be the kind of Arab
nationalism that will perish, I welcome that.
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Stephen Pelletiere : I think you also have to take into account the
situation of the Arabs in the 1950s when this movement began to
attain power. Then it served a function of mobilizing the population
to oppose colonialism.
Graham Fuller: I would accept this, and I agree that there is a place
for pan-Arabism in a cultural sense. But essentially it has been an
instrument of abuse and distortion in Arab politics and I see Iraq as
the worst representative of this now.
Stephen Pelletiere : One of the things I am firmly convinced in is the
fact that the Iraqi Baath under Saddam turned resolutely away from
pan-Arabism. That is why the Syrians never forgave them. By
concentrating on the Gulf and on their own oil production (as in the
Algiers agreement with Iran in 1975), they were out for their own
self-interest in building up Iraq.
Stephen Blank : It is clear that the Arab nationalist role played by
Saddam in the war was a tactical one. It was not wholly so under
Nasser. Political Islam has a similar role. If you look at the history
of Soviet-Iraqi relations from the 1960s on you see that the Soviets
always saw Iraq playing a certain evolution for them. They should
be more involved in the struggle against Israel. They should
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compose their differences with Iran. They should solve the Kurdish
problem. But the Iraqis always followed a "real-politic" kind of
policy in their national interest.
Kamil Said: The only person who was able to unite all the Iraqis was
King Faisal I. He was able to go to the Shiites and say he was
related to them as he came from the family of the Prophet. He told
the Kurds that he was one of them because he was a descendent of
Salah-al-Din Ayyubi. He was a Sunnite as well. He united them. The
whole nation mourned his death. His son, Ghazi, was not a leader. He
did not understand Arab nationalism. The Ummah Party was the
leading nationalist party then and very active in the schools. In 1936
we had the coup of Bakr SIdqi, who was a Kurd who had no concept of
politics. After that, especially under Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam
Hussein, there was no concept of nationalism. He divided the people.
He even divided the members of the family against each other.
Stephen Pelletiere : My point is during the Iran-Iraq war the Iraqi
people made themselves into a nation by defeating the Iranians.. .not
because of Saddam. That is why you have a nation in Iraq today,
except for the Kurds. The Shias and Sunnis, the Arab community, is a
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nation.
Ralph Magnus : How many of the Iraqi prisoners refused to return?
Stephen Pelletiere : Look at what they were put through. Many were
imprisoned for eight years, a lot made accomodations and will never
come back.
Graham Fuller: What about the Shia uprising in the south after the
war?
Stephen Pelletiere: I don't think there was one. I think the Iranians
invaded. Given the chaos that prevailed in southern Iraq at the time,
if that "revolt" had been backed by all the Shias, it could not have
failed. The Republican Guard,, even after their pounding in the war,
was able to put that rebellion down and then turn north to deal with
the Kurds.
Graham Fuller : And yet today in the south reports are that the
Revolutionary Guard rules by day only. The revolt was put down with
exceptional brutality. They had all the heavy weapons.
Stephen Pelletiere : In 1984, when Hakim made the case he could
develop a fifth column in Basra, Khomeini gave him enormous
resources. There was constant propagadizing aimed at the Shia.
There was an invasion coordinated with internal rebellion, but
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nothing happened internally. Khomeini took all resources away from
Hakim and he lapsed into obscurity, only to reemerge at the end of
the recent war. He has no resources or support in the south. He is
appealing to the Arab Shias to support the Iranian Shias, but their
antagonism is too great, even if they are not committed supporters
of the Baath regime. They have not been given a sufficiently
attractive alternative to what they have now.
Eden Nabv : You made the point that Iran would move into the Shia
areas of Iraq, and took this as a given. My trip this spring to Iran it
was clear that the foreign policy establishment was facing a choice
to go towards the Gulf or towards Central Asia.
Stephen Pelletiere : What I am working with is what would be the
power politics in the light of the scenario of the emergence of a
Kurdish state in Iraq. Then the policy makers would have a vague
goal in Central Asia versus the prize of prizes in southern Iraq. The
largest Shia community in the Arab world, the Shia shrines, large oil
fields would be too valuable a prize , with nobody to stop them as
chaos comes to Iraq.
Stephen Blank : Another key point in your scenario would be the
Turkish seizure of the Kurdish state in the north. Would this be
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supported, or would the world look upon this as a beginning of a
steep slide?
Stephen Pelletiere : My view is that there are strong restraints as of
now on Turkey, but that these would disappear with the break up of
Iraq. They would not give it up to the Iranians or the Kurds, and they
view it as their own territory anyway.
Eden Nabv: It is a big assumption to say that Iran is going to go in.
Ralph Magnus : We discussed other changes earlier, including those
caused by the emergence of Azerbaijan and the effect this might
have in Iranian Azerbaijan. Perhaps the Iranians will not be
worrying about advancing into Central Asia or into Basra, but in
trying to defend Tabriz from the Azeris. Here we have a more
credible scenario.
Stephen Blank : A recent article by Shireen Hunter in the Washington
Post raised the point that Iran feels threatened. There is a big
struggle going on in Tehran between schools of foreign policy. Some
want to concentrate on Central Asia, others on their traditional
interests in the Gulf. Larijani, the former deputy foreign minister
wrote in a recent article that the CIS republics were going to fall
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apart in 1992 and Iran has to be ready to act.
Siddiea Noorzov : I would like to suggest another alternative.
Looking at the Iranian behavior in Afghanistan and Lebanon you see
them try to extend their influence gradually over any area that might
appear promising, rather than get involved in an invasion of southern
Iraq that might lead to a confrontation with the United States. They
have learned a lot of lessons about the dangers of war and see they
can get a lot of advantages by operating short of war. This might be
more realistic.
Eden Nabv: I think a good point has been raised about the
preservation of the status quo in the border situation. None of the
southern tier countries would be willing to risk anything to change
borders, because it would threaten borders everywhere. What is
amazing is how similar the situation is all the way from Yugoslavia
to China.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL ASIA BORDERS
Graham E. Fuller, RAND Corporation
Let me start with China. I have a number of questions. When
talking of borders, I think that revision of borders is the most
critical issue. From our discussion of Xinjiang, I don't think that
anyone has any understanding of the demographics of Xinjiang. What
areas would be most likely to go and are highly vulnerable to
separatism.? In which areas is the Han population out of the
picture or is sufficiently distant that they would be unlikely to
influence it. Could chances of big trouble in China that would allow
breakaway groups inspired by other groups to feel that there is a
good chance that certain areas, such as the Uighur and Kazakh to
break away? Irredentism is a critical factor. Would this be
irredentism on the part of the region that is currently run by that
ethnic group in the former Soviet Central Asian states? Or would it
be an action of a minority that would want to join a greater
brotherhood?
We do know in the case of the Kazakhs that the Kazakhs are
calling in their countrymen from the whole world and its clear that
they need to rectify their minority status in their own republic of
roughly forty percent. Hence, they are calling them home from
China, Mongolia, Turkey, Russia and everywhere. We need to think in
terms of potential revision of borders along the Chinese area. But
there is also a lot of interest in the Chinese economic role in the
development of Central Asia. Here there are a lot of possible trade-
offs. Will these overcome, or least temporarily allay the desire to
play an ethnic card? Not the least of China's cards is the railway
and road links. The roads are not good but they come through. There
are a lot of consumer goods coming in and people are coming in too
with their purchases. There are flights as well. I think that the
Turks fly into Tashkent and on to Urumchi. There is an interesting
undertone to some discussions you can have with Central Asians.
They are rethinking their own ethnic identities. On my last visit,
even after heavy propagandizing by Turkey, they were looking more
to Asia. Probably they are grossly overestimating that economic
potential of ties with China, but it may cause them to downplay the
irrendentism and separtism right on their borders. My feeling is
that ethnic passions overcome economic rationale almost any day in
the year.
Eden Nabv : Who would be the most likely breakaway group?
Graham Fuller : I would think that it would be the Kazakhs.
Eden Nabv : In that case, would it be irrendentism or a feeling that
they would like to shift over? That area of northern Xinjiang is not
a native Kazakh area.
Graham Fuller : It doesn't need to be if there is an interst in it. It is
an interesting point that you raise. What if the Chinese want to get
rid of all these Muslims. The Kazakhs might be delighted to have
them.
Eden Nabv : What we are assuming is that viable republics in these
areas must have an ethnic majority of that eponymous republic.
Ideally, then we could redraw the region and give northern
Kazakhstan to the Russians and the Kazakhs of Xinjiang to Alma Ata,
and so forth. Is this the basis we are coming from, which is
basically a Soviet one?
Graham Fuller : Yes, but the case of Kazakhstan is special. They have
a desparate need for demographic strength.
June Teufel Drever : The future revision in Xinjiang is not merely a
Kazakh one, but one of Turkestan, linking a number of ethnic groups.
This was the movement from the 1880s onward, with martyrs, etc.
Graham Fuller : That is true, but in more recent experience, with a
lot of holp from Lenin and Stalin, they have been moving away from a
broader sense of Turkestani identity. I have struggled and been
looking with a magnifying glass to find something like Turkestan and
I haven't found It. In China, as time goes, the change Is that Xinjiang
will be affected by the differentiaion of nationalities. It doesn't
have to be hostile, but each would have their home base. The
Kazakhs are certainly not thinking of Uighurs and Uzbeks coming into
their area, they want only the Kazakhs.
The Chinese are going to have to decide what are their goals in
Central Asia. Are they going to use economics to gain influence to
cut off any ethnic irredentism? Or are they going to entice them and
maybe play a card against Russia?
Graham Fuller : Turkey has no direct border issue relating to the
former USSR except Nakhichevan. More important is Turkey's
participation and involvement In border issues raised by the new
situation. There are six million Azeri Turks in Azerbaijan and
twelve million or so in Iran. There is a great debate as to whether
these people are really Iranians who happen to speak a Turkish
dialect for historical reasons, or whether they are really Turks.
Eden Nabv : What about the Azeri population in eastern Turkey?
Graham Fuller : On the other hand there is a flicker interest in the
situation of the Alavi Shia of eastern Turkey. All Turks are suddenly
getting interested in their ethnic origins. For the first time it is
permissible to talk about this. Most of them in Turkey tend to be
Sunni. Even about twenty five percent of the Azeris in Azerbaijan
are Sunni.
A possible border rectification that essentially springs from the
end of the Soviet Union, could be the breakaway of the Iranian
Azeris to join the Baku Azeris. This is especially relevant with the
new government in Baku, and Elcibey has talked about this openly.
He says that ultimately there will be unification of the two
Azerbaijans. At the same time he remarked on the short lived
character of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Whatever happens with
the Azeris, the Iranians are going to blame the Turks. The Turks are
obviously very happy over having a pro-Turklish regime in Baku. I
sense that the Turks and Iranians are headed for a collision course.
The fear for Turkey in the current situation is that it will be forced
to come down on the side of Azerbaijan versus the Armenians, and
this will upset world opinion, Turkish role as a responsible regional
power and can do little to help Turkey.
The major factor in Turkey is a series of exclusions from
participation in Europe being exacerbated by the Kurdish issue in
Turkey, which is now emphasizing racism in Turkey for the first
time since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. New vistas
are opening in the Caucasus and Central Asia, thus fulfilling in
principle the old Soviet specter of Pan-Turanism, which had no real
prospects before.
Stephen Blank : Now Turkey and Bulgaria are very close against
Greece and Serbia. Demirel understands the dangers, but he might
not be able to do anything about them.
Eden Naby : What has happened on the World War I claims of
Armenia... say reparations or even territorial claims?
Graham Fuller : This had been almost utterly shelved. Even eight
months ago Turkish-Armenian relations were moving ahead by leaps
and bounds. Armenia had cancelled the commemoration of the
"genocide". Turkey was in the process of opening up a land corridor
to give the Armenians access to the port of Trabzon and they were
being included as an "honorary Black Sea power" In regional talks.
There was much that was very promising there that could be
disasterously damanged. In the past six months Turkey and Armenia
moved ahead on establishing good relations. Ter-Petrossian has
publically called for friendly relations and would like to open a
corridor to the Black Sea.
The Azeris are a threat to Iran. A year ago I talked to the Azeri
national front people about the dangers to Iran, the fact that this
could lead to the break up of Iran. One of them replied: "That's
tough, but this isn't the era of empires anyway." Thereby assigning
Iran to the category, which is not totally inaccurate, of an empire.
A likely Iranian retaliation would be for them to aid the Kurds in
Turkey. All of this is a spin-off from the emergence of Azerbaijan
as an independent nation. Rational Armenians realize that they live
in a sea of Turks and the Turks are the people they are going to have
to come to terms with. The Armenians had been used by the
Russians as pawns against the Turks. The Nagorno-Karabakh is one
of the ugliest legacies of Stalinism, but it is all coming to a head
now, involving the Armenians, Turkey and the Kurds - even Iraq
indirectly. It has all been kicked off by the emergence of Azerbaijan
and by the Gulf War, which accelerated the timetable. Turkey's role
8in Central Asia has undergone some modification in the past nine
months. Turkey was viewed with great delight and enthusiasim in
Central Asia. Their first image was one of the big (and rich) brother.
The new image is still warm but also more realistic: "Let's not put
all our eggs in one basket; Turkey is very far away and we were
never part of the Ottoman Empire." As well as, "How can the Turks
help us get into Europe when they can't do it themselves?" Finally,
"We are at least as much an Asian people." In other words, they have
seen the downside of Turkish ties. I found a sense that there was an
open market for them. The Indians had suggested they were unhappy
that the Turks were getting too much favorable publicity. Even
though it was not a religious tie, but and ethnic tie, they were
nervous. They are especially interested in the Kazakhs as
secularists. For a great economic power right in the region, India
looks pretty good. India has always been involved, with traditional
ties with Uzbekistan
Eden Nabv : India has been sending in food to Central Asia throughout
the Soviet period, by both land and air. Now the air routes are
continuing and have to be subsidized. India has shown its
willingness to subsidize its Central Asian trade by air routes for
political reasons. Is there an economic use for India in Central Asia
when the bridge has to be Afghanistan?
Graham Fuller : They are thinking markets. Here, cheap goods from
India would be practical. Pakistan wants to have Islamic strategic
depth and has geostrategic arguments for alliances with China and
Islam. Its very important for India that this not be realized. India
hopes to recreate its USSR alliance with ties to Central Asia.
Stephen Blank : There were two geostrategic arguments for the
Indo-Soviet alliance. One was China and the other was Pakistan and
Islam.
Graham Fuller : There was also the third world tie, with India
serving as the entry for the Soviets.
Eden Nabv : India would not be interested in seeing any regional
economic development as we have seen talked about in the past six
months.
Siddieq Noorzoy : It's one thing to trade certain commodities with
each other. Every country in the world has some kinds of these ties,
but it is another thing to use for political pressure.
Stephen Blank : This is just what they are trying to do and both sides
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are aware of this.
Eden Nabv : India may well be interested. However, there has been a
clear lessening of India's economic presence in Tashkent recently.
There stores have been closing down, and they have been there for
the past five years.
Graham Fuller : Yes, and the Afghan ones are growning. To finish on
the Turkish side, we have to realize the incredible infancy of
geopolitical views In Central Asia today. To rethink the Turkish role
is certainly not something shocking; it's more a realization that
there is a big world out there and we have many options. If we think
of the initial Russian turnabout in the late
Gorbachev era in their views of the Turks there was a view that they
didn't need to worry about pan-Turkism any more. The view was that
the Turks were good and their bilateral relations should be models
of perestroika. The Russians were writing lots of articles that the
Turks were good economic models and were bringing in secularism.
Nine months later things had changed. When Demirel went to Central
Asia recently, he made one very provocative remark, I think it was in
Kyrgyzstan. He said not only had they suffered for years, but they
were still tied to the ruble zone He didn't carry it any further, but
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there was the idea that perhaps they ought to be "liberated". The
Turks have proposed a union of Turkish states and a currency union.
This is obviously a direct threat to Russian economic interests at
least. It doesn't have to be geostrategic. Maybe the Russians will
have to rethink their relations with Turkey. This could be
associated with their recent tilt towards Iran recently. When Jim
Baker was going through the area and saying: "Turkey good, Iran
bad", this has provoked a little reaction. They don't want Turkey to
take the place away from them in orientation. The United States'
anti-Iranian position makes Russia think twice about appearing too
pro-Turkish.
Stephen Pelletiere : I would like to know what they are talking about
in Turkey towards Iraq and the Kurds. There has to be some sort of
nationalist feeling boiling up in Turkey, as you said, over seeing the
Azeris being beaten by the Armenians.
Graham Fuller : There is a great deal of anguish in Turkey over the de
facto creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. What the
Implications of this for Turkey are quietly being discussed in elite
circles, but it hasn't really hit the press as yet. There is awareness
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of the possibility of a federated Turkey, or at worst case of a
Kurdish breakaway from Turkey. On the popular level there is a good
deal of anger at the Kurds. It is not that they are going to come
down to seize northern Iraq. But the best Turkish political thinkers,
those who are trying to make the best of a bad situation, are
examining the possibility of becoming the de facto protectors of an
independent Kurdistan. The future Kurdish state will be linked
somehow to Turkey.
Stephen Pelletiere : The people the Kurds hate the most are the
Turks.
Graham Fuller : Now, the Kurds are being well-integrated in Turkey,
especially in the economically developed areas. Are they going to
look around to choose Iraq or Iran? In western Turkey they are very
well integrated. Half of Izmir is Kurdish. If they look around to find
a state where they have the possibility of a good life. ..and I agree
that living in Diyarbakir is not a great life, it is Turkey. They have
ability to live anywhere in Turkey This is where they are most
advanced and educated. Kemal was deadset against Kurds, but this
Kemalist legacy is dying daily. This new thinking is shown by the
fact that in December 1991 the military endorsed Demirel's
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recognition of the Kurdish language. The chief of the general staff
was there.
June Teufel Drever : Is Turkey involved in secret operations in
Xinjiang? There are several groups that could be involved in
rebellions as there are always charges of "foreign involvement"
nnade by the Chinese.
Graham Fuller : I don't think that this is an object of the Turkish
goverenment, though they might have some intelligence collection.
They actually blame the Saudis and that is more plausible. They
have been sending in financial support and Qur'ans.
June Teufel Drever : We need not think that only one foreign power is
Involved. For instance, in the 1959 rebellion in Tibet, the CIA, Indian
intelligence and Taiwan were all involved.
Graham Fuller : If it were true that Turkish intelligence was
involved in Xinjiang rebellions, it would have come out by now.
Stephen Blank : My sense of Turkey is like yours. The government
and Demirel realizes that if Turkey sends in troops to the Caucasus
there would be no end in sight. "Do we really want increased
tensions with Russia?", is his view. But they are being pulled into
all these Islamic trouble spots, and feel they have to go with the
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tide.
Eden Nabv : What is the tide?
Stephen Blank : The tide is all of these break away movements.
Muslims are being attacked in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the
feeling in the public that we have to go in and protect our co-
religionist. Demirel said it correctly when he warned that if they
went into the Caucasus militarily, they would still be there twenty
years later. Do they want a Northern Ireland on their borders? That
is the real question.
Graham Fuller : The Kemalist legacy has been to stay away from
foreign adventures and pan-Turanism.
Eden Nabv : They had to because they had the Soviets on their
northern borders, but they are no longer there.
Graham Fuller : I don't think that there is any danger of Iranian
irredentism towards Central Asia. There has not been a hint of this
in anything the Iranians have written at any point. They have
potential problems with the Turkmen tribes on both sides of the
border. Whatever Jim Baker has to say about Iran being bad, and the
ruling circles in Central Asia are well aware of the dangers of
"fundamentalism", they still see that if they want access to the
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West it would have to be through Iran. No Central Asian state is
going to place Into danger their opening to the West, the Gulf, and
even to Turkey. This is the important geopolitical card for Iran, vis-
a-vis Turkey, even though in the cultural context they might be
loosing. Finally, the Islamic influence from Iran to Central Asia Is
still powerful. It is the concept of political Islam, symbolized by
Iran, and it is potent even in Sunni areas and despite the Iran-Iraq
war. But this doesn't have to be "made in Iran", rather it is a way of
getting power for those who lack it and for uniting people
domestically and internationally. Iran is still an important example.
The Iranians are in a triple dilemma; are they to emphasize their
Persian, Shia or Islamic political identities? They have never
sorted this out, and they may try to do all of them.
Stephen Pelletiere : The radical leadership in Iran is still all there,
despite having lost the elections. Look at all the rioting following
the election. Rafsanjani can initiate a lot of moves, but if he can't
clear it with the radicals can he be effective? The clerical regime
has had twelve years to deliver on their social promises and they
haven't.
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Graham Fuller: They haven't really had twelve years. You have to
excise eight years of the war. Now they are much more cautious
than two years ago But in Central Asia, the prospects for Islam are
wide open, whether or not Iran is involved. Historically, the Central
Asian officials have been able to "take care" of Islam, and to put it
in a box. But current officials can't judge strength of political
Islam. Even the Uzbeks can't understand that the days of
manipulation of "official" Islamic institutions under state control is
ineffective versus revolutionary Islam if there is no distance
between the state and official Islam. None of them understand it,
although not all are currently confronted with it. Certainly, in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it is very weak. In Uzbekistan they were
utterly in panic, which they hadn't been nine months before. They
have a lot of learning to do, and they need to study the examples of
the Middle East, such as Pakistan, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt and
Jordan.
Stephen Blank : Should a political Islamic movement come to power,
would it be unique or would it follow the Iranian model? Is Iran a
political threat by virtue of its military-political power, or Is it an
ideological threat?
17
Graham Fuller : No one knows completely, but I would guess that it
would follow its own historical pattern. But the pattern of political
Islam in there and elsewhere is undeniable. Iran, by its very
existence, is a threat to Gulf security. It's not that they are going to
attack their neighbors like Iraq. They are exporting an idea
primarily. What could they do. ..export revolution and create
instability.
Eden Nabv : The existence of Iran legitimizes Islam by revolution.
Stephen Pelletiere : The eight years of war demonstrated that the
Iraqi Shia didn't want to have anything to do with the Iranian Islamic
regime.
Graham Fuller : I disagree. There is a fairly powerful movement
linked to Iran among the Shia of Iraq. It has immense power in the
south.
Siddieq Noorzov : Supposing you have an Islamic state. Just what is
its threat? Is it going to limit the economic gains of the West, or of
Japan? Or are they going to export revolution? Are they going to
create instability within the region therefore you have to get
involved militarily?
Stephen Blank : One of the things we would be worried over the
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situation in Egypt, If Egypt were to go Islamic, our situation in the
Middle East would be seriously undermined.
Eden Nabv : You are assuming that Islam is against us.
Stephen Pelletiere : What we see in the case of Algeria is a kind of
urban protest movement of unemployed youth. What is really
worrisome is that the same group would take power in Tunisia and
would move against Egypt. If we were to have an unfriendly regime
in Egypt, we would loose a base for manuevers. We would have to be
worried about passage through the Suez Canal.
June Teufel Drever : We would loose the Camp David Agreement,
would we not?
Graham Fuller : That is not for sure. But Steve is correct in that
that kind of political Islam tends to link economic dissatisfaction
with the concept of Western exploitation. It would move in an
undesirable direction. This would have an impact in Central Asia.
They could feel they were not being treated well as part of the third
world exploited by the West. The security situtation would be linked
to economic disappointment. To finish on the Iranian point. I had
talked about the three strategic options that Iran faced, namely
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universal Islam, Shia Islam or "Perisanism". The "Persian" option is
still possible for Iran. They could work to break away northern
Afghanistan and form an ethnic belt. I don't say it is likely, but it is
conceivable given the way other empires have gone, and Afghanistan
is in a way a mini-empire. At least a portion of the Tajik population
would be very favorable in that this would provide them with the
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demographic depth of face the Turkic peoples. I could image Iran
being interested, putting aside religion, could be looking at
essentially an ethnic belt that would take them from the borders of
China through Tajikistan, across northern Afghanistan, and into the
Hazara region, which is not only Persian speaking but Shia. This is
one version of things reaching a highly consolidated state of
ethnicity as the determining element.
Siddieq Noorzov : Dustam (the ethnic Uzbek general) goes to Kabul, he
doesn't stay in Mazar-i-Sharif. Why does he go there- because it is
the center. There are a lot of Pushtuns there as well. Ahmad Shah
Mas'ud has no idea of breaking-up Afghanistan. He has not
associated himself with Iran, or for that matter with north of the
border.
Graham Fuller: That is a rational argument. But the Pushtuns could
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loose the game by overplaying their hand and deny what the Uzbeks
and Tajiks feel they deserve in the long course of the jihad In the
old days, you could say that they had nowhere else to go. It is a rich
agricultural region and in theory could be the transportation hub of
routes from the north. The notion of an independent northern
Afghanistan is no longer unthinkable. Now the non-Pushtuns of the
north have an alternative.
Siddieq Noorzov : When Najib was in power there was talk that he
could shift the base of power to the north and split up the country.
They would not do that. Nobody in Afghanistan is remotely thinking
of this.
Eden Nabv : All along in the jihad, since 1978, there has been a theme
in the mujahidin literature that they are fighting the Russians now
in Afghanistan, and once we get done with this we fight the Russians
to the north. The idea is of Bokhara as a symbol of colonial conquest.
Now that the Russian colonialism in Bokhara is removed, what does
Bokhara symbolize now for the Afghan mujahidin? Is It now free,
and not an object for liberation anymore?
Siddieo Noorzoy : It is now an independent new country and is going
to be helped to find its way along what the new Afghan leadership
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feel is a cooperative manner.
Ralph Magnus : The Afghans are thinking that their jihad liberated
Bokhara as well as it disintegrated the Soviet Union, so they are all
allies now. I recall a recent quote of an Ayatollah at Friday prayers
In Tehran to the effect that now that the Afghans have won this war,
Islam has won the war, and the Afghans should thus acknowledge the
true leader of the entire Islamic world, Ayatollah Khameine'i, the
"Faqlh" of Iran.
Eden Nabv : Now that the Russians are no longer the imperialists in
Bokhara, what is the conflict? There are two things: there could be
a secularist government in Tashkent that could suppress Islamic
activity; the second is suppose you get an Uzbek-Tajik conflict in
Bokhara. Then what is the Kabul government going to do? If we get
a major repression of Islam in Central Asia, then I think the Afghans
might have something to say.
Graham Fuller . One of the fears in northern Afghanistan was that
the ethnic tensions between Uzbek and Tajik in Central Asia would
spill over there, where it had not been much of a problem before. To
take this scenario to its end in examining the border implications
These are very clear with a domino effect. We see the breakup of
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the Iranian empire with the Azeris being the linchpin. They leave,
the Kurds leave, the Turkmen are uncertain.
If Afghanistan becomes truncated you are left with a rump Pushtun
state, and the whole Pushtunistan issue comes right back into play,
despite the hopes of the Pakistanis that they had put the issue to
final rest by aiding the mujahidin all those years. The Baluch would
feel that it would be their turn and in theory. You loose Pakistan as
a viable state.
Stephen Blank : Maybe Pakistan has come to realize that the only
way it can survive is for Afghanistan to survive as a state. If
Hekmatyar wins and tries to establish a Pushtun Afghanistan, would
that mean protracted war within Afghanistan?
Siddieq Noorzov : This is a much overplayed scenario In the press.
The war has been fought by a cross section of Afghanistan. In
Hekmatyar's hospital I visited in Peshawar in 1980, one saw a cross
section of the people, from the Hazarajat, from Koh-i-Dahman,
Pushtun, and no one made any distinction as to what language one
was speaking, or whether you were Sunni or Shia. The reason that
one sees this kind of a statement is that others have made counter-
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statements that it is our turn to take over the government now, or
the Shias are claiming that they are thirty percent of the population.
But if you look at the development of the jihad you see
universalistic and egalitarian expectations. The idea is that all
people have to play a role. That is the attitude of all the
commanders I have spoken to.
Stephen Blank : But if Hekmatyar comes to power
Siddieq Noorzov : He cannot come to power. He knows that and
everyone else knows it. When he was offered the post of prime
minister In the interim government, he declined, but proposed a
Tajik from the north for the post.
Graham Fuller : I hope that you are right and you probably are right. I
just think we would be remiss in not raising this prospect so we
could be sensitized to signals that that event might be happening.
The Indians have to be ambivalent to the prospect of the break up of
nations, even of Pakistan. Short sightedly, India has been accused
all along of wanting to prove that Paksitan was never viable and
they will all have to return to the Indian motherland. But the
example of Kashmir and the "intifadah" is going on now questions
this. The critical question is thus: "Is India exempt from dangers of
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breakaway nationalism because of the relatively democratic
character of its regime?"
We all agreed that China was in very risky shape, not only because
of ethnic problems but because of the legacy of brutal repression
and fifty years of communism. Is India going to be able to survive
because of its democratic character?
Stephen Blank : You already have a situation in which two prime
ministers have been killed because of ethnic terrorism- there is no
way they are immune. They may not be destroyed and they may be
able to ride it out, but they will have to live with it.
CULTURAL FACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA BORDER ISSUES
Eden Naby, Harvard University
I wish to concentrate on the cultural aspects of the borders,
especially international issues but also the borders between the
Central Asian republics. I will probably stray away from the
cultural aspects to touch on economics, because this is my new
interest and I believe economics lies at the heart of the success or
failure of these states. I hold that both internal and international
borders are highly susceptible to change. I will begin with
Azerbaijan and make a sweep to Kazakhstan. I want to look at the
constraints and incentives to these changes from their internal
aspects rather than outside interference, especially as they relate
to language, religion and ethnicity.
Language has a number of aspects. One category is actual language
use and dominance and secondly in terms of alphabet. A very good
model that my husband, Richard Frye, has written about and
facilitates his study of the ancient period can be applied here. What
we have today In Central Asia and what we always have had is
various levels of language. First there is a family language that is
used in the village that is used for casual converstation; it is
considered the mother-tongue. Second is the literary language,
which may or not be the same language, but often a quite different
dialect. Then, there is a working or professional or merchant
language. And finally there are dialects which may or not be
understandable to everyone.
These categories help to clarify whether Russian is a usable
working language now versus local ones. It helps us to examine how
Turkish language may work out, and the importance of the "created"
nationality languages In the area. For most of urban Central Asia
and for most professional people Russian is still an indispensible
language. It continues to be important for people who are at their
most productive stages of their lives, between 25 and 65. They use
it to communicate professionally, particularly outside their own
republics. Even with two Uzbeks or two Tajiks who know their
native languages perfectly well, you find them conducting
professional discussions in Russian. However a very important
language is emerging for International aspects as they need
something other than Russian, and English is beginning to fill that
gap. But the language for most of the people is their family ethnic
language, except in Kazakhstan. Outside of the city this is even
more true, even in professions.
There has been a strong attempt to make the literary language the
same as the ethnic language, but it has failed thus far. This is a
very important thing to remember when you try to look at how
important is Turkish for the Turkic speaking areas. In the last 15 to
20 years we have seen a great change in the literary language. This
is particularly true from professional intellectuals who have been
able to leave to travel. They have gone to Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan. Afghanistan has has a great effect on the languages of
Central Asia as they have come into contact with literary languages
which are similar to their own and they have begun to adapt their
own literary languages. Today's Tajik newpapers written in the
Cyrillic alphabet are virtually unintelligible to people in the
villages. They are copying Iranian Persian and eliminating Tajik
usages that had been forced into the language, particularly after
World War II. These changes are thus bringing the literary languages
much closer to those outside of the Soviet Union. ..Turkish and
Persian. The change is not only in syntax, but also in vocabulary.
The adoption of Persian journalist usages means a lot more Arabic
and a lot less Turkic. Many of the usages that were identified by
Soviet linguists as being particularly "Tajik", and predating new
Persian, are being dropped. A lot of this is coming from many
Central Asians who served in Afghanistan, not all of them in the
military, but as translators and in cultural jobs from two to four
years. Now they say that they really learned the Tajik language from
the Afghan Tajik speakers. The standard of purity is no longer the
Soviet Tajik that was set up for Tajikistan in the 1930s, but more
and more standard Persian, whether you want to call it the Dari
(Afghan) version or the Iranian version. This is a real cultural shift,
even excluding the question of alphabet.
It is surprising to find how many people know the Arabic
alphabet, people who never admitted knowing the Arabic alphabet.
They know it well enough to place in the forth or fifth level of
teaching or they are able to come forth as teachers. There are now
numerous articles appearing revealing how the language had been
taught in families and through hidden books. In fact schools are
being set up In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to teach at the beginning
level. It has now moved into the educational system. We already
have a breakdown in cultural borders occuring in Central Asia with
the rest of the Middle East.
The whole alphabet issue is still unsettled except In Tajikistan,
where the eventual adoption of the Arabic alphabet is accepted. In
other areas it is complicated by the religious issue. The religious
elements want to have the adoption of the Arabic alphabet, but they
are constrained by the argument that it is easier to learn in an
alphabet that has the short vowels, which are not present in Arabic.
If they are going to be trained in the Latin alphabet they will have
easier access to Turkish publications. Azerbaijan has taken the leap,
and in several stages has accepted the Latin alphabet and Tajikistan
has settled on the Arabic alphabet. However, this is something for
the future, not even In the next five years. When they are talking
about converting government documents into local languages, this
means local languages written in the Cyrillic alphabet. Is there to
be a direct translation from Russian to these forms (postal,
passports, etc.), or are they to go to international forms and rewrite
these into local languages? My understanding as of the time I left in
March that the issue had not been settled, although there are
commissions in all of the Central Asian republics to deal with the
problem.
Overall, the language barriers which were created to separate
peoples who were similar or essentially the same across
international boundries are breaking down. The boundry with
Xinjiang is not going to be affected by this, as the Uighurs and
Kazakhs there use a modified Arabic alphabet, not the standard
Arabic alphabet that it used in Arab countries, Iran and Afghanistan.
It was developed in Baku in 1923 and was adopted in Xinjiang in the
mid-1970s, where it replaced a Latin alphabet. This modified Arabic
alphabet drops those consonants that are not pronounced in Uighur or
Kazakh
and it has added short vowels. It is very difficult to read for people
who know the standard Arabic alphabet. There are at least five new
letters that are unreconizable to anyone outside of Xinjiang, whether
literate in Arabic or Turkic languages. This alphabet was used in
Central Asia from 1923 to 1928. Thus, while the language barriers of
Central Asia with the south seem to breaking down, this is not
necessarily true with Xinjiang. In fact, the alphabets have changed
so often that whole generations have become illiterate overnight.
Ralph Magnus : Could you say that there is anything like "pure"
Arabic; is there in other words what might be called a "religious"
language?
Eden Nabv : There is an Arabic religious language that is emerging as
a taught language in madrasses. It had always been taught in the
two official madrasses in Bokhara and Tashkent, and there are now
official madrasses being set up in many other places. But what is
really interesting is the large number of unofficial madrasses being
set up by many communities.
Sometimes they have taken over the original madrasses. Usually
these need a lot of restoration and the question arises of who is
going to pay for it. In several instances I noted in Uzbekistan the
locals have argued that that the restored madrasses will become
tourist attractions and therefore the local government should share
in the cost. The use of Arabic now is very much as in the pre-Soviet
period. It is a written and read language not a spoken language.
When you have students from the madrassas being sent abroad to
study (many to Pakistan, funded by the Saudis) the language that
they need is English. And English is being taught in the madrassas in
addition to Arabic as the language of international communication.
Siddique Noorzov : This is the same situation as in Iran.
8Eden Nabv : Yes, but in Iran there is a major effort to get Arabic to
be a spoken language as well. To go on to religion, we see that Sunni
Islam is almost universal in Central Asia (though not in Azerbaijan).
However, there is a very important non-Sunni and non-Twelver Shia
group In Tajikistan, which is critical to understanding the political
devetopments there. ..the Isma'llis.
All religion in the Soviet period was regulated but it has taken
virtual free reign and the powers of the established religious
groupings has broken down a great deal. Very important in this has
been the emergence of the Islamic Renaissance Party, which began in
Astrakhan as an all Soviet Union party with branches in each of the
republics. Except in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, this was illegal. The
party became legal in Tajikistan directly after the elections in
November 1991. It gained the opportunity for organization,
publications, etc., and is capable of wielding direct political power.
Nabiyev made it legal after the elections for several reasons,
including the fact that it helped to splinter the Islamic movement.
In Uzbekistan, Karimov has never allowed the party to be legal. He
has tried to made sure that the official Islamic directorate does not
play a political role either. This is a very difficult thing to keep a
lid on, and I suspect it will boil over if there are other conditions
that break down. In Tajikistan, the party is legal and able to vent
Its grievances without violence. If this is so, why do we have the
demonstrations there? This is due to the existence of the Isma'ilis.
They have a long history in Central Asia. They are a cross border
people living in the Pamirs and In Badakhshan. They are closely
related historically and in actual family relations to Isma'ilis living
across the border in Afganistan, in Pakistan and in China. The whole
Pamir knot is virtually exclusively Isma'ili, along with scattered
groups of Kirgiz that have immigrated into the area that are not too
active politically. They have maintained their ties with one another,
although those in the USSR were not able to send their tribute to the
Agha Khan, their spiritual leader or Imam, since 1927. Those outside
of Tajikistan have benefitted from their ties to the Agha Khan and
his fortune, in areas such as arglcultural development, tourism, etc.
In the Pamir areas of Pakistan that had been neglected by the
government these have a great impact. Those in Tajikistan have
made some effort to attract the attention of the Agha Khan. There
are some other Isma'ilis in other parts of the former Soviet Union,
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including Bokhara, Samarl<and in Uzbekistan, and in other parts of
Tajikistan. In China, the entire community that is called Tajik is
Isma'iii.
All these Isma'ilis are not really Tajik. They are not Persian
speaking. They have several languages in the Iranian family.. .not
just dialects., about five languages including Wakhi, that are not
mutually intelligible. There was an effort by the Soviets in the
1930s to try to write these, but they are not written. In Afghanistan
these languages were never written and the Isma'ilis were probably
the most oppressed of all the groups in the country. Thus, after 1978,
the Isma'ilis of Afghanistan were one of the few ethnic groups that
backed the Kabul regime. During this period they were able to build
closer ties to the Isma'ilis of Tajikistan. This may lead to the two
Badakhshans of Tajikistan and Afghanistan getting together. In the
recent demonstrations in Tajikistan and in the previous election the
Isma'ilis functioned as "The Democratic Party". Their candidates and
membership tended to be regional, with a strong presence in
Dushanbe. In the 1950s they had been promoted by Moscow against
other regions of Tajikistan. In the elections of November, the two
Sunni groups of the official establishment and the Renaissance Party
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cooperated, the Isma'ilis withdrew. With Nabiyev coming from the
north, in a mixed area of Uzbeks and Tajiks with many Isma'ilis as
well, they were able to throw their strength to Nabiyev because they
didn't want the Sunni groups to be in power. We have in Tajikistan
not a religious unity, but a very strong Isma'ili group which crosses
the border. However, they are divided by the fact that they don't
have a common language. They also use Persian instead of Arabic as
their religious language. In Dushanbe they strongly supported
Persian. If there is any change for Tajikistan to break up into an
Uzbek section, an Afghan section, etc., the Isma'ilis are going to
oppose this. They are also the most strongly anti-Uzbek group In
Tajikistan. They are traditional enemies as the Uzbek khans enslaved
them. You will not find Uzbek-Tajik bilingualism among the
Isma'ilis, as you find among many Sunni Tajiks.
Siddieq Noorzov : There were numbers of Isma'ili militia, reported at
10,000 that took part in the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif that precipitated
the fall of the Najibullah regime.
Eden Nabv : The Agha Khan send a representative last year to
Samarkand, but he didn't send one to Tajikistan because he didn't
want to become embroiled in their political controversies. This year
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he is going officially to Samarkand for the Agha Khan annual awards
for Islamic architecture. He has helped the communities in Pakistan
and China and there is a good chance that he will be able to help the
Isma'ill areas of Central Asia
Because all these people have been cut off from each other across
international borders statistics are even harder for them of acquire
than for us. Particularly in Soviet Central Asia have very
exaggerated notions as to how many of their co-ethnics live across
international borders. They seem to think that they have huge
numbers of co-ethnics around them, along with great expectations
that, first of all, they are going to be helped by them and,
second,that somehow they are going to eventually have closer
dealings with them. Some Uzbeks feel that northern Afghanistan
was part of the Uzbek domains and might be again in the future. The
reality is that northern Afghanistan is a mixture of various ethnic
groups.
Siddieo Noorzov : Most of the Uzbeks, over 200,000 of them, are
refugees from the Soviets in the 1920s.
Eden Nabv : A lot of them were, but I don't know about most of them.
Certainly, much of northern Afghanistan was part of the Bokhara
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emirate, but it would be re-writing history to claim that this state
was wholly Uzbek; it was also Tajik.
The second issue that confounds the ethnic issue is the question
as to what is the ethnic identity of people who live outside of the
Soviet borders, or for that matter, of those who live inside. Many
have identities that are confused. A sedentary, de-tribalized Turkic
speaking person in northern Afghanistan does not necessarily
identify himself as an Uzbek, where that person in Tashkent would
so identify himself. Thus, the creation of an Uzbek identity in the
Soviet period has warped peoples' ideas of who they are and their
relationship with people outside. The relationship of Uzbeks to
Uighurs in Xinjiang is similarly confused. Where does Uzbek and
Uighur Identity come from? They were all more or less similar
sedentary Turkic peoples strongly influenced by Iranian culture.
During the Soviet period they tried to create identities for
themselves historically that separated them.
In Afghanistan, if you asked them what language they speak, they
would say "Turki". After 1978 the Taraki regime tried to say that
"you are an Uzbek and you are a Turkmen" and they created a
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nationality policy.. .but it failed. The government published
newspapers and maybe fifty years from now somebody will look at
that and say: "Yes, there were Uzbeks living in northern
Afgahnistan." In fact that was a government policy set up in Kabul
with people from Tashkent running those newspapers.
There are people who have been educated to believe in the Uzbek
or Uighar identity, but outside the cities these identities often have
no meaning. It is possible that they may fade away. It will be the
result of the outcome of the power struggle between the urban
elites, basically the nomenklatura, and the countryside. Of course,
there is the whole issue of Islam that ties the Uighur and Uzbeks
together as Sunnis. If there are any people who are persecuted in
Xinjiang it is the Isma'ilis because they are not Sunni.
The other issue to keep in mind in Central Asia, particularly
between Uzbeks and Tajiks is the fact that many lived in bilingual
and bicultural areas. In Bokhara, Samarkand and the valley
stretching from Samarkand eastward, including Kojand. You find
families where one full brother is Tajik and the other is Uzbek.
Depending on the political pressures at the time of birth one is
reglsted as one or the other. There are brothers who do speak a
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different language, yet their identities tend not to be rooted in
culture. This will take some time to iron out in Central Asia. In
Dushanbe you have 23% of the population listed as Uzbek, but they all
speak Tajik... though they may speak Uzbek too. There has to be some
mechanism for people to re-identify themselves ethnically, as was
done in Bokhara and
Samarkand, or some other way to sift out their identities.
Graham Fuller : I remember a good friend in Moscow who was the
leading translator of Dari to Russian. He said that he was struck by
the fact that the Soviet Tajiks in Afghanistan often preferred to be
mistaken for Soviet Uzbeks, because this gave them greater
prestige. If not prestige, at least power.
Eden Nabv : The Uzbeks would certainly have greater numbers. The
Turkmen are different because they have kept their tribal identities,
even when sedentarized. But this has little effect on non-tribal
Tajiks and Uzbeks.
Who are these people? There is a great deal of fluidity in the
internal borders, at least between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan there
is some fluidity in international borders. A great deal depends on
how the situation in Afghanistan works out. In northern Afghanistan
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works out. In northern Afghanistan you have representation of all of them.
And It is northern Afghanistan that has held the key to Central Asian
ethnic and cultural aspects.
These relationships also have a positive aspect, making the area
susceptible to economic and other cooperative efforts... .such as between
Uzbeks, Uighurs and with Afghanistan in terms of trade and with South
Asia in term of religion.
ECONOMIC FACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIAN BORDER ISSUES
M. Siddieq Noorzoy, University of Alberta
We don't know very much of what the economies of the Central
Asia states are or can be. There are two unknowns operating to
hinder the emergence of any new model. These republics have been
part of the Soviet economy. We don't know, for example, what the
GDP would be in Tajikistan. Thus, individually, we don't know much
about their industrial structures. The other problem is that there
is so much political confusion as to what may transpire. Any
economic arrangements for the future would have to follow political
arrangements. Economic integration as a goal would have to come
either from governments or from pressure from the private sector.
There could be gains from economies of scale, freeing labor
movements or freeing technology or capital. Since we don't know
what these political arrangements might be we can only make some
broad generalizations.
There are five scenarios for future development, any one of which
could be viable:
I. Existing arrangements from the USSR status quo could be
maintained.
2. There could be a political framework in the CIS, but with
different arrangements of redistribution, income, output,
investments, etc. In this they would not feel exploited as they feel
they have been. There would be more equality in allocating income
and costs. One of the glaring examples of this exploitation has been
the destruction of the Aral Sea due to the agricultural policies
imposed by the USSR on the region.
3. They could form their own organization for economic
cooperation, without giving up their individual newly found
international economic ties We know something about their
populations and resources, though less about their incomes. Their
resouces are largely mineral and agricultural. This could have a
customs union, a common market and conditions to attract foreign
investments.
4. They could each go along with ties to outside organizations
with their Muslim neighbors to the south. There is a framework that
has existed for some time between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation, of which some have joined
and others have attended the February Tehran meeting in the status
of observers. At the same time an Islamic Common Market was
proposed.
5. Each state could open up and generate its own trade,
investment, aid, etc., decisions not just in the region or in the CIS.
The decision makers will be those officials who buy up the current
state properties. They will be open to the world, i.e., Japan, the
West, etc., and would join international organizations such as GATT
and the World Bank the Asian Development Bank. If the status quo
cannot be maintained
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arrangements with Russia are unworkable,
and if they feel the size of their economies are too small and their
resources are too scattered, they could act as normal members of
the international system.
Any one of these might be viable, depending on the political
assumptions one is willing to make. For example, if the status quo
should be maintained, the existing elites would have a vital interest
in this This might not be uniform, however, Kazakhstan might
attract much more investement and Tajikistan's elites might want
to opt for different arrangements to maintain their power.
Secondly, one has to assume for this to continue it would first
require that Russia would be able to maintain its subsidies and to
keep Russian troops in the region. They would have to use the ruble,
but this might not have the same effect should the ruble become
convertible. Now, dependence on the ruble is an obstacle to any
other arrangement that might be attempted, such as arrangements
with other Muslim countries. A third assumption would be that
although the rest of the world might have their own interests in this
area they would maintain a hands off policy. Japan, for instance,
might be able to offer a much better deal to Central Asians than
could the Russians. They could offer direct investments to help
secure their entry into what could be a sizable market in the future.
All of the players in Central Asia have a stake in what they might
see emerge.
An "Islamic Common Market" has been suggested by Pakistan as a
possible scenario, but it is not viable as of now. There are a variety
of reasons why this is so, but I would like to mention two of them
here. The "Islamic Republics" of the world have yet to resolve all
the issues involved as to what can be considered an Islamic
economic system. This is particularly true of the issue of interest.
In the Holy Qur'an and traditions riba (literally: increase) Is
is forbidden as usury, but the precise interpretation of what is or is
not riba is the subject of a huge body of the Shariah .
A second issue is that kind of Common Market along European
lines as a trading arrangement is not what Islamic states are
seeking. The European process was an evolutionary one from 1957 to
1992, which only recently in the Maastricht agreement have they
come to the core of harmonizing their monetary and fiscal policies
in seeking a common currency. Initially, they were a free trade area
on the model of the United States. They particularly wanted to
achieve economies of scale. The EEC moved into political
statements only In 1985 and 1991, but this is not fully resolved as
yet as witnessed in the Danish vote rejecting the Maastricht
agreement.
There are other trading arrangements which might prove more
attractive models. The APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation)
is one. This was formed In 1980 (the United States, Canada, Japan,
China, Taiwan, Australia, Hong Kong and the ASEAN states) and has
moved to increase trade volume and to reduce tariffs.
Graham Fuller : Do you mean states with a Muslim majority are
Islamic Republics, or Is there a specific model or models of self-
conscious "Islamic Republics"?
Siddieq Noorzov : In the initial stage It was Iran, Turkey and
Pakistan, but the Central Asians were Invited as well. An "Islamic
Common Market" was proposed in Tehran in February 1992. At most
it envisages a free trade area along the lines of APEC, although it
has discussed direct investments and technology transfers. This is
the most they could hope for now.. .not a common market.
June Teufel Drever : How is APEC actually run? Have they really
reduced tariffs?
Siddieq Noorzoy : Within the framework of GATT, they have.
June Teufel Dreyer : China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are not members
of GATT, they are observers.
Siddieq Noorzoy : The volume of their trade has significantly
increased because of the formation of APEC. Also, the Japanese
investments have increased. The data since 1980 shows that.
Eden Nabv : The fact is APEC reduces tariffs among themselves and
this is a model that could be applied in Central Asia. What other
aspects of APEC could you see as applicable to Central Asia?
Siddieo Noorzov : The issues of direct investments and transfer of
technology, without political ramifications necessarily, are others.
Eden Nabv : What we have in Central Asia, particularly with Iran and
Turkey, is direct investments and technology transfer. Iran is also
talking about reducing tariffs.
Stephen Blank : The Central Asians are interested in diversifying
their economies, and outsiders are interested in getting in so others
can't close them out. Political interests in the future are certainly
a viable reason for all to get involved economically.
Siddieq Noorzov : As I mentioned in the beginning, you have to make
certain political assumptions before you can then generate certain
economic scenarios. Certainly, if the United States were to invest a
couple of billion dollars there we don't want the rise of a Russian
Empire that would nationalize investments as they did after 1917.
There is also the possibility of influencing a country politically so
you can generate the conditions for economic investment. This is an
issue for all countries carrying out trading and investments in
Central Asia. You can assume that all countries will do that, openly
or not.
June Teufel Drever : To what extent are the Central Asian economies
complementary or, even if they are not, can they manage to
specialize in different industries, such as In ASEAN?
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and distribution they tend to be primary producers, some
manufacting in textiles, but largely minerals and agriculture. They
are competitive not in their domestic economies, but in third
country markets. For instance, Turkemistan and Kazakhstan would
compete with each other in marketing gas. There is
complementarity of goods produced there with their southern
neighbors from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Turkey.
Eden Nabv : Doesn't the fact that they are geographically contiguous
make the issues of complementarity and competitiveness different?
The very fact of competitiveness could serve production as they
could transport across their areas much more easily and rapidly than
could outsiders.
Siddieq Noorzov : One of the things they could borrow from the
Common Market is the allocation and reallocation of investments.
Small plants producing the same commodities in different countries
could consolidate and achieve economies of scale. This is also an
argument for economic integration between Canada and the United
Eden Nabv : Isn't this the very problem we are facing with the break-
up of the USSR in that all production of certain goods was centered
in a single area, for instance all sugar in the Ukraine? This could
lead to inefficiency rather than competitiveness.
Siddieq Noorzov : The economies of scale vary from product to
product, thus each industry has an optimum plant size. For example,
a steel mill's optimum size is about a million tons. If there isn't a
market for this, or if the plan is faulty as were most Soviet plans,
you lost the efficiency of scale. When market forces are doing their
job, it is different.
Stephen Blank : I see a difference. Central Asia has no outlets to the
sea and a poor transportation system oriented only towards Russia.
They are still going to rely on somebody to enter the world
economy.. .they need transit routes. That kind of economic
dependence eventually turns into political dependence.
Eden Nabv : This is not true if they have alternative routes, such as
through Afghanistan, Iran, China, etc. You don't have political
obligations.
Stephen Blank : You have less. You've multilateralized your political
obligations. That is the most they can hope for.
Siddieq Noorzov : Afghanistan is another land-locked country. Its
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trade used to take place largely through Pakistan and Iran. For the
last fifteen years it has been diverted to go through the Soviet Union
at subsidized rates. Now, the Afghan government is saying that they
want to get the same low rates or they will not continue these trade
routes. There is now an agreement between Pakistan and Tajikistan
for the transfer of electric power
Eden Nabv: Some of these investments will come from Iran and
Turkey.
June Teufel Drever : One country with an enormous amount available
for investment is Taiwan. There is about ninety billion dollars
available.
Stephen Blank : There is an overall shortage of capital world wide,
and it is going to go where it feels it has the best chance of making
money. This is not likely to be Central Asia, particularly when you
look at their infrastructure, health systems, and structure of the
labor force.
Eden Nabv : It is surprising which countries are making investments.
Israel has made quite a few investments.
Graham Fuller : The Central Asians have this sense, I fear, that the
world is looking upon them as them greedily as an incredibly rich
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place. It is fairly modest in its resources and politically difficult
to get into. I would guess that they are not going to be the objects
of intense competition.
Ralph Magnus : Investors are always interested in how they are going
to get their money out. As long as they are part of the ruble zone,
this might be difficult.
Eden Nabv: The Israelis are investing and they have good plans on
how they are going to get their money out by exporting products
their factories produce. They have the manpower and the knowledge
to make money in Central Asia.

ASIAN BORDER ISSUES AND UNITED STATES INTERESTS
Ralph H. Magnus, Naval Postgraduate School
An interesting way of approaching the current situation is to
draw historical parallels, which I would like to do here. Another
issue is the role of the United States in the current situation. A few
months ago at a conference I attended dealing with roughly the
same subject matter.. .the emergence of Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, the
Kurds, Afghanistan, etc. ...we were treated to excellent papers about
things going on in the area, but nobody looked at what was, could be
or should be the policy of the United States toward all of this. The
impression given was that these were things that were happening to
which we would have to react. In fact, as Steve Pelletiere brought
out regarding the Kurdish question, we can see that the United
States is probably the most important actor, certainly the most im-
portant outside actor, involved there. This is not to say that we
could do whatever we wish to do.
If we look to historical parallels, we can see that we are in a
similar postion to that of Britain in the post-World War I era. All
their enemies were destroyed. ..the Ottoman, German and Habsburg
empires - even the Russian empire that was their ally in the Great
War but their traditional enemy in the Middle East and Central Asia.
They were in control from Egypt to China, if they wanted to be. They
could rearrange whatever borders they wished to, and of course they
did so. They also had the League of Nations, conquerable to the
United Nations but in fact under their control - partly because the
United States chose not to join.
Out of these peace settlements of post-World War I were created
many of the problems we are still dealing with today. Artificial
boundries and whole artificial states were established. Whether
they could have done anything differently is another matter, but
what they did do created, for instance, the Kurdish problem among
others.
In 1947 there was a similar situation. Here you had the post-
World War II situation, with the great effects on the Middle East and
Afghanistan of the disintegration of the British Indian empire. This
was supposedly voluntary, and this brought us such situations as
Bangladesh, Kashmir and Pushtunistan.
Today there is an conquerable situation, albeit not exactly the
same. This is the reorganization of a major area of Asia including
Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia. Perhaps, indeed, we are into
a re-ordering of all of Asia as we have already discussed the
involvement of China, India, Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. What we need
in this situation is more of an idea of what we want in this re-
ordering. What I see now is a total lack of vision in Washington of
anything regarding this. People there not only lack any vision of
what we want here, they don't even realize the situation we are in.
The poverty of United States policy making is glaringly obvious. For
example, we supported Gorbachev to to the end, with a view of
keeping the Soviet empire together in the name of stability. Now we
have administration's policy of keeping the Chinese empire together
under its current leadership because it too is stable. Maybe we don't
want it stable. An empire is not necessarily a bad idea, indeed, we
could look at an empire as one of the preferred political means for
organizing the Middle East. Certainly, it was an effective way of
handling ethnic Issues. If an empire had an overarching imperial
Idea,, you could have Kurds, Arabs and Turks together under the aegis
of a "Good Sultan". Thus, they could have a common ideological value
for society. As we look today at Central Asia or the Caucasus, could
we find any ideological value that could allow people to live
together so that it would make little difference whether a person
was an Uzbek living in Tajikistan or the reverse? If we look purely
at nation states and fixed political borders, and have to carve up
everyone into the categories of national self-determination, we face
the question of deciding when and where to stop and what
impossible borders we will arrive at. This should raise the
possibility of creating some broader kinds of groupings.
We need to consider the importance of United States policy and
Its potential to be an important or even decisive actor - if we
wanted to be. We are occupying the same role that the British did in
1918 and which they fulfilled, in their own self-interest, of course.
In the post World War II period they fulfilled a similar role, with
less immediate success in the breakup of their Indian empire.
Stephen Pelletiere : What I see as a difference is that Britain after
World War I had a definite policy under its foreign secretary, Lord
Curzon. Especially with regard to Iran, they weren't completely
alone in deciding the issues. Russia in the form of Soviet power re-
emerged. I agree that we not only don't know what we want but be
don't know the situation either. The difference is that we don't have
a policy as did Curzon.
Stephen Blank : I like the idea of historical parallels. We are
basically a status quo power. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815
Metternich has a similar policy of stasis, in contradiction to the
British policy. This was truly conservative but could accomodate
change and even revolution. If a people wanted to change their form
of government as long as they didn't threaten their neighbors they
could be accomodated in the international system.
Perhaps that is something we should look at if we are looking at
American interests. In this region these interests are: one, the
access to oil, and two, the defense of Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Other than these there is no vital interest which the United States
is bound to protect.
June Teulfel Drever: What do you see that Israel is a vital interest?
Stephen Blank : Why? Because we have committed ourselves.
Stephen Pelletiere : We have just gone through a revolution in the
region and the world. One side the the equation has collapsed.
Instead of going back and saying we are doing this because we have
committed to do so, we need to look anew. The big difference is that
we continue to have a vital interest in the access to oil, but this
doesn't involve Israel. We have to defend this ourselves, not through
surrogates, and we do it through CENTCOM. Unless you can make a
strong case through sentiment, or political pressure, we have no
obligation.
Stephen Blank : It is a democracy.
Stephen Pelletiere : That is another difference; ideology plays and
entirely different role than in the Cold War.
Graham Fuller : Obviously, nobody in the United States wants to see
Israel sink beneath the waves. But what the level of commitment
needed to assure this is an entirely different thing. Israel is quite
capable of defending itself, given occassional purchases of American
arms.
Stephen Blank : I am not saying that we must underwrite a blank
cheque to support whatever policies Israel wishes, but the basic
commitment to its security is there.
Graham Fuller : The commitment to Egypt is fine, but what a new
fundamentalist government comes to power there and it is hostile to
the United States?
Stephen Blank : Both Israel and Egypt are things that CENTCOM might
be committed to defend. They are not going to be committed to the
Kurds or to interfere in Iran, unless Iran does something to its
neighbors that effects the oil situation. There are only a limited
number of scenarios that require the exercise of military force in
the region.
Ralph Magnus: But our interests do not always have to be defended
by military means.
Siddieq Noorzov : We have been looking at the possible re-emergence
of the Soviet empire. It is clearly in our interest that this doesn't
happen.
Eden Nabv : There is one reason why the United States can and should
be interested in Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. This is because
if there are major conflicts there it will draw in others on the
periphery, including such large states as Russia and China, so we
may have a military interest in maintaining peace. The second is the
question of Israel. Whether or not we have an obligation to defend
them Is one thing, but if Israel is threatened and is going to use its
technological options, including the nuclear option, that will involve
others and we certainly have an obligation to make sure this doesn't
happen.
Stephen Blank : The great question all the way across the area to
8India is the development of high-tech weapons, or even of what was
high-tech twenty years ago. These include nuclear, chemical,
ballistic missiles, etc. in such places as Kazakhstan, Iran, Pakistan,
India, Iraq, etc. Russia is irresponsibly involved in selling weapons
all over the place. But the technology Is world wide.
Eden Nabv : But if the United States is a military power, why do we
not interfere in this process?
Stephen Blank : We do it all the time.
Ralph Magnus : We have to look at what the United States role is, and
I suggest that we could look at some historical analogies. In both of
the instances I raised we had Democratic presidents, Woodrow
Wilson and Harry Truman, and they seemed to possess (cerainly in
the case of Wilson) perhaps an excess of vision. This reminds me of
a meeting I had in Pakistan in 1983 with a high Pakistani official
when we were trying to establish a system of getting medical
supplies to the Afghan mujahidin and people inside Afghanistan
through Americares. This official was, and I'm sure still is, a
convinced Islamist. I had been warned that prior discussing any
business you had to be prepared for a thirty minute lecture, if you
were fortunate, on Islam. This proved to be the case and the text of
his "sermon" was the fact that "America has not had a foreign policy
worthy of its people since Woodrow Wilson. ..including freedom, anti-
imperialism and the support of the self-determination of peoples.
Why can't you have such a policy now?" I told him that we did, as
demonstrated by our support of the Afghan mujahidin's struggle for
freedom and self-determination. Evidently, this was the correct
answer, as he agreed to help us establish our aid program.
It is interesting that Truman came up with a new policy for the
Middle East, along with its moral justification, in just ten weeks in
1947. He also had a vision, based primarily I believe on his own
experience in the trenches in France in World War I. He stated that
the United States had gotten involved in two World Wars to defend
the freedom and order of Europe. We were now facing a new
potential and actual aggressor in the Middle East in the form of the
Soviet Union. Therefore, we needed to support freedom in this area
before it became necessary to do so by military means. Here, as
with Wilson's Fourteen Points, you had a statement of principles as
the basis, or at least as the justification, of policy. Recently, in the
Kuwait crisis, out of President Bush's many statements there were
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some points of principle made, including the support for democracy
and the opposition to tyranny, but these were quickly relegated to
the back burner.
Somehow, for a policy to be successful in this area and in an era
when there Is more popular participation than ever, you can't have an
effective policy, even in the protection of your narrow self-
interests, without a foundation of principle. The people of the
region realize that having mere order at the expense of oppression is
no longer what they want, nor do they accept that one ethnic group
has a kind of divine right to rule over another.
When you have ideas, people and organizations willing to fight for
their beliefs, this has to be taken into account. What principles are
acceptable to both the United States and to the people of the region?
Is it self-determination? Is it democracy? Is it collective security
or is It even international law and support for the right of sovereign
states to exist in peace and security under the United Nations'
Charter? This final principle seemed at times in the Gulf War to be
the official justification of United States actions. Or, does the
United States merely want to create order and it doesn't matter if
this is Gorbachev's order, Deng Xiao Ping's order or Saddam Hussein's
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order, as long as things are stable for the United States?
Stephen Blank : There was a lot of talk of collective security during
the war, but on closer examination it turns out that there was very
little collective involved. Today, nobody is talking collective
security in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Self-determination is a
wonderful principle, but in this area it is beyond the capability of
the American government, much less the Ameican people to
discriminate among rival claims.
Graham Fuller : It is not up to us to decide whose claims are or are
not valid. The press of circumstances will determine this. The main
argument is that we are not going to move heaven and earth to try to
keep nations together when they seem destined not to stay together,
and this is where I differ from Steve Pelletiere in the case of Iraq.
Yes, it is a nice idea to have some kind of federation to succeed the
USSR, but it might not work, as Yugoslavia didn't work since it was
created at gun-point. We have to be relatively open to the idea that
there may be many countries with the end of the Cold War that are
going to be put in question.
Stephen Blank : It may be an argument for eclecticism. There is no
principle out there that can encompass such a fluid reality.
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Ralph Magnus : But in effect there is a principle, as our State
Department comes down on the side of the status quo ninety-nine
times out of a hundred.
Graham Fuller: These are not rival ethnic claims. A group says, "We
are what we are and we want to leave."
Eden Nabv : But that flexibility still has to be based on some kind of
principles.
Graham Fuller : It certainly can't be based on the negation of self-
determination. I don't think that self-determination on the basis of
ethnicity is the greatest principle in the world. It doesn't produce
governments with a high degree of tolerance, but it's what we have
to work with. The critical thing is to try to find various other
mechanisms by which minorities can live and be protected within
states without having to declare their independence in their own
state.
Ralph Magnus : Of course, the Wilsonian formula was both self-
determination and minority rights guaranteed by international law
and agreements. Eventually, the minority rights went by the board.
Graham Fuller : There have been some interesting recent
developments in this area of internatioal law. The concept of
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sovereignty is beginning to be reinterpreted. Saddam's idea that you
can't touch me because of Iraq's sovereignty seems to be challenged
if the ruler is usurping his power and abusing his people. ..and, more
importantly, his neighbors. At some point the international
community can say that it is involved and he can't claim im-
munity based on sovereignty.
Stephen Peiletiere : The problem is that this elevates the United
States to the position of a judge. We are the people with the power
to do something about it, if we determine that someone is "bad" for
his people.
Graham Fuller : The old rule was that the international community
almost never became involved. We did not recognize this in the
Kuwait crisis, which was a case of protecting one nation against
another, but the protection of the Kurds is different.
Stephen Peiletiere : There was a lot of feeling in this country that
the United States should go in to remove Saddam Hussein from
power.
Ralph Magnus : Yes, and it was expressed by George Bush himself.
Stephen Blank : I would like to see the present and future Hitlers and
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Pol Pots removed too, but in the end it is a question of power. In the
United States we accomodate ourselves well to people like the
Chinese leadership, which doesn't seem to treat their own people too
well, feeling we have a compelling interest in a stable and
integrated China. I don't like the idea of a generalized right of
"humanitarian" intervention against regimes that "mistreat" their
own minorities. It is open to the most grievous kinds of abuse, and
be corrupted into a platform for intervention which was used by both
Hitler and Stalin to "protect" minorities whenever they wanted a
piece of Eastern Europe.
Graham Fuller : But this doesn't mean that we have to have a policy
of military intervention. There are all kinds of other sanctions and
interventions short of war.
Stephen Pelletiere : What you are overlooking, Graham, is that there
can indeed by a range of techniques from sanctions, embargoes, etc.,
but behind these there has to be military force, which means the
United States.
Eden Nabv : But in the boycotting of South Africa, there wasn't a
military threat.
Graham Fuller : The point is that there are other means and the
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United States and other states are going to lean on those means
first. There will be more of this rather than less.
Siddieq Noorzov : I doubt very much if the United States is going to
be involved in this way. You have to go through Congress and have a
lobby. I look at the classic case of Afghanistan. The United States
helped only selectively and when it wanted to. It was not a general
movement and only succeeded because it was pushed by a few
individuals, such as Senator Tsongas.
Graham Fuller : I'm not saying we can do whatever we want. It is
possible to apply a range of sanctions to a number of nations that
are involved in unacceptable behavior to their people.
Stephen Blank : You can surely try these, but do they change
behavior?
Ralph Magnus : They haven't been too effective in changing Castro's
behavior after having been applied for thirty years.
Stephen Pelletiere : Nobody is arguing that there are not a number of
non-military sanctions that can be used. What we are trying is to
find the principle you use to make the determination to use them. If
it is merely that the people don't like their ruler and neither do his
neighbors, I don't think that is too functional a principle.
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Stephen Blank : Since Yeltsin came to power he advocated that the
CSCE ought to have a mechanism for protecting the rights of
minorities in Europe, and this may be even by force. Now we have
Yugoslavia and Milosevic. What to the Russians do-they vetoed it.
Graham Fuller : Ultimately, they agreed that Serbia's conduct was
outrageous and supported the sanctions now in force.
Ralph Magnus : The situation right now in the former USSR is that
people are so anxious to get something out of the international
community that we have a good deal of leverage, so we won't have to
use force.
June Teufel Dreyer : Don't we have an international court?
Siddique Noorzov : We need a better method of settling disputes than
through the United Nations. The military position of the United
States will become Increasingly limited. There is growth of income
elsewhere in the world at a much more rapid rate than here, and the
weight of this country is going to be changing relatively. How long
can you project that current military options will persist into the
next century?
Stephen Blank : When the Libyan case was before the World Court a
few months ago the United States announced that if it found for
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Libya, we would not accept the decision.
Graham Fuller : We are just entering a new era. I agree that there
isn't a glorious history of international law on these matters but,
increasingly, there is an interest in developing some kind of system
of the protection of minority rights as minority rights and ethnic
conflict become more prominent. It will take time to develop these.
Eden Nabv : How willing is the United States to become the military
policeman?
Stephen Pelletiere : I think that if the United States sees its vital
interests at stake it will intervene. Increasingly, because of the
world economy, what affects the system affects the United States.
In Desert Storm the system was threatened and we moved; in
Yugoslavia the system was not threated.
Graham Fuller : But we did opt to move very heavily against Belgrade.
Stephen Blank : And it took us two years to get even the minimal
activism we now have.
Eden Nabv : You mean that it has to be a direct United States interest
and not a general support for world peace?
Ralph Magnus: Part of the reason the Europeans took two years to
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move was that the United States was supporting the unity of
Yugoslavia for two years.
June Teufel Drever: In the present era there is no assumption that it
is in the best interest of the United States to have a stable, well-
integrated country X. We need a careful determination of what vital
United States interest are, and there may be one or two other than
oil. We need to see what are the economic arrangements disrupted,
what are the consequences of instability- are refugee flows
created? We must realize that we might not be able to influence
what is going on. When President Bush made the statement that it
was in our best interests to have a stable, calm Yugoslavia, one
group took that as an excuse to start beating up on everyone else.
Eden Nabv: It seems to me that June has raised some issues which
need to be taken up if we have something constructive to say.
June Teufel Drever : I want to know what are the criteria. It seems
that we are getting lost in specific cases. I think that Steve's
remark on the World Court was right on the mark. The United States
also refused to submit to the judgement of the court on the mining
of Nicaragua's harbors.
Eden Nabv : After World War I and World War II we tried to create
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some kind of world order, and now we are trying again.
Stephen Pelletiere : Look at what was created after World War I.
The mandate system proposed to offer tutelage of states to bring
them into a democratic order. The imperialists using this considered
it an extension of the imperialist system.
Eden Nabv: It was a step out of the imperialist system, but it was
not a comepete one.
Ralph Manqus : It was their compromise to come up with something
as a reply to Wilsonian self-determination.
Stephen Blank : There is another point from the 1918 analogy that is
even more relevant to today. The British set out to impose an order
all the way from Egypt to China. It proved to be beyond their power
and resources. They couldn't stand it financially, and we won't be
able to either. We can't underwrite a new world order when we are
busy competing with everyone else for markets, resources, etc.
Graham Fuller: We are talking about mechanisms of international
law and international government. We are not talking about
unilateral United States intervention. Some, or much, of our
military budget should go to these efforts. We could certainly
afford to give a tenth of our military budget, or thirty billion, for
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United Nations peace keeping. Now we don't even pay what we
owe. ..two or three billion dollars.
Stephen Blank : Are we going to expect the Japanese to underwrite
the costs of these actions and we call the shots as to where and
when these troops have to go?
Siddieq Noorzov : The whole issue is the fact that unilateral military
action to solve these conflicts is not going to survive. There will be
countries that will not come in. There will be countries that will
coalesce against it. It will just be unworkable.
June Teufel Drever : The United Nations is increasingly
unrepresentative of the new world order. The Chinese don't belong in
the Security Council. I'm not sure Britain belongs. I see Japan
financing some of these operations as a small forward step. We
have to do a lot of bargaining to get the Security Council to do what
we want. For example, President Bush had to promise tacitly to
maintain their most favored nation status if they agreed to
abstain on military action In the Gulf crisis.
Graham Fuller : These recent events were still part of the Cold War
environment. They are not fast principles and there has been a
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remarkable movement in a very short period. President Bush
realized that he could have gone into Kuwait unilaterally, but felt
there were advantages to doing this through the United Nations. It is
going to be very hard to find cases for unilateral United States
intervention.
Stephen Pelletiere : The United States has a repeated polcy of
intervening in the Middle East if it felt its oil interests were being
threatened. Now, we may have been wrong as to the reality of these
threats.
Graham Fuller : I don't think that our oil interests have ever been
threatened. Kuwait was a very complicated case and we can't yet
come to any determination as to what happened.
Stephen Pelletiere : The most persuasive line that I heard at the
time was that if we allowed Saddam to control 20 percent of the
world's oil, our interests were bound to be affected.
Graham Fuller : That was a potent argument. But that did not mean
that Saddam wasn't going to sell us Kuwaiti oil.
Ralph Magnus: Are we applying these principles, or the lack of the
same only to the Middle East? Do we have any interest in Central
Asia more strictly considered?
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Eden Nabv : Does the United States feel that the maintenance of
current international boundries is vital to us as part of maintaining
peace?
Ralph Magnus : This was certainly one of the points raised by
President Bush during the Kuwait crisis as one of the five points
why we should be defending Kuwait. There is the principle in
international law that established borders should not be changed
unilaterally and by force.
Graham Fuller : Eden, I believe that if the Nigeria-Biafra issue were
to come up again that this time the world would not allow Nigeria to
act In the same manner because we felt that Nigeria had to stay
together and African boundries were sacred. It is probably
preferable not to change international borders, but each case has to
be examined on its merits.. .what can we really do in any case, will it
create international refugee problems.. ..etc.
June Teufel Drever : I can't agree that it is preferable; it is not for
us to say.
Stephen Blank : Preferable for us.
June Teufel Drever : But it might be preferable for us to have a
border changed.
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Graham Fuller : We would rather have more stability than less
stability, although this was a greatly overworked virtue in the Cold
War. Is there something less than these drastic changes that they
and we could accept? Could the Kurds settle for less?
Stephen Pelletiere: What is really holding up a deal between Saddam
Hussein and the Kurds is the status of Kirkuk. They could have a deal
tomorrow, in fact Barzani has one, on autonomy for the Kurdish area.
However, the Kurds claim Kirkuk and the Iraqis won't give up the oil.
Graham Fuller : Specifically, you are correct. But there is also the
question that nobody believes Saddam Hussein would honor any
agreement longer than he has to. But, hypothetically, we should look
at changes to see if there are other means than the changing of
boundries or secession to solve these questions.. .could there be
federalism?
Eden Nabv : Where would these solutions be discussed? Would it be
in the United States, In an international conference, in the United
Nations?
Stephen Blank : Look at Central Asia. We have the fact that every
border inside the ex-USSR is questionable, or could be. There is an
enormous potential for trouble and violence, and we don't have the
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foggiest idea how to deal with it.
Eden Nabv : One solution would be to say that we are supporting
existing borders.
Stephen Blank : But this would mean resigning ourselves to perpetual
violence.
Eden Nabv : I don't agree. If you are talking of military violence,
there could be regional forces which wouldn't allow this. We could
support this.
June Teufel Drever: Couldn't you add a clause that the United States
supports the principle of peaceful negotiations over border issues?
Ralph Magnus : That is not necessarily a solution, however. You've
had forty years of peaceful negotiations over Kashmir and nothing
has been resolved except three wars with another on the horizon.
June Teufel Drever : You are not saying that this would work; you are
just supporting the principle.
Stephen Blank : Look at Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1987 or 88 the
Aremenians raised the issue. In 1988 the Azerbaijanis, with Soviet
support, started killing people and driving them off the land.
Fighting went on for three years. In August 1991 Yeltsin comes in
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and the Armenians feel they are in better shape and begin killing
Azerbaijanis. Who is right? The Arn^ienians say they want peaceful
negotiations.
June Teufel Drever : it doesn't always work. The United States must
go on to say that when violence does occur, when there is an
escalation of economic and political refugees, when there are human
rights violations, then we need to reevaluate our policy.
Siddieq Noorzoy: The statement that we don't know how to solve the
border problems of the ex-USSR emmanates from the fact that they
don't know what to do about them either. They are afraid to do
anything. These decisions have been taken away from a single party
to a system of consensus decision making. This can guarantee the
efficacy of pressure by peaceful means.
Stephen Blank : We do have examples of successful mediation of
wars and conflicts, as witnessed by Camp David, Tashkent in 1965
and the Sino-Soviet border dispute. They can be mediated by a
genuine third party.. .Peru or Ecuador for instance, not Iran, as it is
trying to do in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Siddieq Noorzov : We could use the IMF or World Bank as a workable
model for these kinds of actions. The United States has a major
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stake in funding and voting in them. It can influence policy but it
can't guarantee 100 percent of the policy. We can exercise
leadership but by consensus.
Eden Nabv : Suppose we look at two hypothetical cases. In one Iran
decideds to take over the Turkmen gas fields. Who is going to say
anything?
Siddieq Noorzov : The Russians would say something.
Eden Nabv : But they are separated geographically.
Graham Fuller : Because this was Iran's actions, it would serve as a
red flag to the world.
Eden Nabv : Only because it was Iran? Suppose the Afghan mujahidin
decide that Bokhara ought to be part of Afghanistan? Or that it
needs to be freed from the comunist Karimov? Who is going to say
anything?
Stephen Blank : Yeltsin would, because they have a collective
security treaty.
Stephen Pelletiere : The only thing I can see as something solid is oil
as a vital interest. If you can demonstrate another vital interest I
would consider it. It would have to be something that would have a
monumental effect on our domestic life.
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Eden Nabv : If Iran were to move into Turkmenistan or the Afghans
into Bokhara, then Yeltsin would have a legal position for action.
This could be the spearhead for the extension of Russian military
power.
Graham Fuller : There would be the principle of a major military
aggression and aggrandizement. This, as a general principle, is
largely unacceptable in this world
Stephen Blank : We are witnessing just this right now in Serbian
actions in Bosnia. We are not getting involved, as we were in Desert
Storm.
Ralph Magnus : There are lesser forms of military involvement than
Desert Storm. We were involved in Afghanistan militarily by giving
arms through Pakistan
Graham Fuller . We are talking about a range of options short of
military.
Eden Nabv : You are saying that you don't see the United States acting
miltarily, at least in the next decade, unless it involves oil.
Stephen Pettetiere : Yes.
Ralph Magnus : What about Israel?
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Stephen Pelletiere : I would assume that the context of the threat to
Israel would by such that we would be forced to use military action
only as a last resort. Under the old bi-polar world there was a
compulsion to compete for the entire world. There are a lot of areas
where people could go to one side or the other and there is no
compulsion forcing us to move.
June Teufel Drever: What of the question of Korea. North Korea is
very close to getting a nuclear capability and the government Is run
by an aging tyrant and his son. We have a security treaty with South
Korea. Where is our vital interest? Yet, should we re-write the
treaty? Should we try to destabilize North Korea before it gets
nuclear capability?
Stephen Pelletiere : I would say that we would move if North Korea
invaded South Korea, vital interest or not, because this would
trigger a whole range of historical experience of the Korean War, and
because United States troops are stationed there now,
Siddieq Noorzov : What of the case of Turkey invading Armenia?
Stephen Pelletiere : We do nothing militarily. We could do a lot
short of war, embargoes and so forth.
Eden Nabv : Has nationalism provided the basis for the retention of
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the current states of what used to be called "The Northern Tier"?
Can they maintain themselves? Can we take them on a case by case
basis? We talked about Iran, and found that this was a good question
to apply to Iran in the Azerbaijan issue. Are the Iranian Azeris so
integrated into Iranian culture that calls to separate from Iran
would be rejected?
Graham Fuller: Afghanistan is another case. So is Turkey and the
Caucasus states.
Eden Nabv : Are we satisfied to say that there are a large portion of
the Kurds in Turkey that are successfully integrated since the
Kemalist period, so they would not want to break away to join a
newly formed Kurdish state on their borders?
Ralph Magnus : We can certainly say that President Ozal's economic
development policies in Southeast Turkey are aimed precisely at
this goal.. .the integration of the Kurds into Turkey. This is a
constructive way of handling ethnic issues. As we look as to what
United States actions might be, other than coming in as a fire
brigade to put out local conflagations, we should look at this sort of
thing. What could the United States do to promote integration,
peaceful relations and so forth in Central Asia? One thing that the
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United States does do well, and certainly did do in the post World
War II era, was some kind of economic reconstruction, or perhaps
some actual physical construction. Perhaps we should build a "Great
Central Asian Freeway" from Alma Ata to Kararchi?
Stephen Blank : I agree. We did a paper for the Army In which I
argued that the failure of the United States to support economic
development in Eastern Europe is leading to the exacerbation of
crises in such places as Czechoslovakia. To the extent that we and
our allies can contribute to the economic well being across this vast
area we will substantially help to mitigate nationalist conflicts by
giving more people a stake in stability or, better still, in an
evolutionary outcome.
Graham Fuller : Perhaps another way would be to develop "sub-
threshold" arrangements for ethnic minorities what would allow
them to substitute for total independence and self-determination in
areas like language, human rights, etc.?
Eden Naby : Some could be on the cultural level, others would involve
economic aspects.
Stephen Pelletiere : Let's look at the area to pick out what points we
think have been most degraded and are most likely to slip into
31
violence. Then, study these on a case by case basis to see which
factors are similar and operating in a number of areas. We all agree
that the Armenians, Azeris and Kurds are dangerous issues.
Siddieq Noorzov : Even these territorial issues are ultimately
economic.
Graham Fuller : In a lot of cases it has been the passions of
nationalism that has allowed people to ignore economic issues.
Eden Nabv : There are things in Central Asia, such as water issues,
that could allow them to pull together economically. These make
them interdependent. Some areas are watersheds that control the
water resources of an entire region.
Ralph Magnus : As Turkey does for much of the Middle East.
Eden Nabv : Precisely. They might lead to an agreement for the
sharing of water resources and hydroelectricty, or the they might
lead to conflict.
Siddieq Noorzov : Economic issues can be targeted in terms of the
problems they have or to their possible solutions. They can be
attacked either unilaterally or internationally in consortiums
involving Germans, Japanese, Americans, etc. This could be a
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cohesive package that could appeal to the world for people to send in
technicians, capital and getting involved in privatization. ..where
nobody has a solution thus far.
Stephen Blank : These are economic problems, but there are issues in
each area where a solution can either further or mitigate conflict.
Still, they create opportunities as well.
Siddieq Noorzov : But to achieve this we need a reorientation on the
part of the United States. Where do we go in the next five years for
aiding these states' resources for growth sitmulation, market
creation, privatization and encouraging local entrepreneurs?
Ralph Magnus : One the the clear things we can all agree on regarding
Central Asia is that it is land-locked. The opening of routes to the
sea is an important part of the solution. If Iran wanted to export
everything Central Asia could produce, there would not be enough
railroads, roads, ports, etc., to handle all of it. The Iranian
facilities would collapse.
Stephen Blank : There is a need for visionary thinking, hypothetically
a canal from the Caspian to the Gulf.. .which is probably
impossible. ..could break them out of isolation and re-integrate them
into the world trade routes.
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Eden Nabv : Transport, and perhaps even more importantly
I communications, is a way to integrate these areas. Communications
I.
doesn't require so much investment, it is more of a service industry.
Siddieq Noorzov : You have to begin in areas where there are short
term payoffs.
Eden Nabv: Water is a potential source of conflict, and there is going
to have to be a revolution in the creation of new laws as a
productive way of cooling these conflicts.
Ralph Magnus : After the initial clash in Kashmir between India and
Pakistan they did restore relations to a degree. Then India made
unilateral developments in the Punjab watershed that adversely
affected Pakistan. This was the "second shoe" after Kashmir that
turned Pakistan against having genuine cooperation with India.
Stephen Pelletiere : We have to realize why were are here. The old
order has disintegrated. What in the area is sufficiently important
for the United States to be involved?
Graham Fuller : I have tried very hard to look at this. Oil is mostly
involved indirectly, although the Tengiz field is undoubtably
important for Chevron. Most of our interest in negative. We know
what we don't want and we don't want conflict that can cause the
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reemergence of Russian imperialism. We don't want Chinese
intervention, nor do we want Iranian domination.
EPILOGUE ON ETHNICITY AND INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
Eden Naby, Harvard University
International law regards the retention of established
international borders as a critical cornerstone. Firm adherence to
this position has been maintained by regional organizations
throughout Africa, Europe and Latin America despite pressures
which have largely emanated from ethnic forces. At present, a clear
challenge to the maintenance of the status quo on international
border issues is present in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East and in
Asia. An outcome in any one of the critical siutuations throughout
the globe that redraws international bourndaries and succeeds in
establishing stable governments will result in a major rethinking of
border Issues In the entire legal and political structure of the world.
Just such resolutions to ethnic inspired border rearrangements
appear underway in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the former
Soviet Union which will certainly effect Ireland, Iraq, and possibly
Afghanistan and the sub-continent of India, Iran and Russian and
Chinese Central Asia. How we can anticipate the effects to world
stablillty and progress from changes in border status quo has been
the concern of the participants of this workshop on borders.
Inherent in any discussion of of border issues are questions relating
to the relationship between the concepts of ethnicity and
nationalism, and between stability and status quo. These two sets
of concepts are steeped in internal dilemmas: Must ethnicity form
the basis for nationalism? Does the status quo represent forces for
stability, a major condition under which political, economic and
social progress can occur?
Decolonization and international Borders
In the Middle East in particular, where, In the aftermath of
Ottoman disintegration and European conquest, borders were planned
or drawn without regard to the principle of national self-
determination the fragility of the border status quo has been
highlighted by the sudden independence of neighboring Muslim
republics throughtout the Caucasus and Central Asia. During the
decolonization period following World War II, former borders, with
all their ethnic vices and historical claims conflicts were retained.
Just as major ethnic groups were stranded and remain so in the
Middle East after World War I, so with the formation of countries
out of the former Soviet Union, the ethnic conflict, submerged
before, now thrusts itself onto the political stage by independence.
To groups such as Kurds, Palestinians, and Assyrians, ignored in the
suffle to create mandates, then states, which have carried forth
decades of struggle for the only status
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they believe, that would
confer on them equality in international affairs, have been added
others from former Soviet lands. These new ethnic conflicts bear
directly on the viability of international borders.
Particularly affected by Soviet border issues are Iran and
Afghanistan. Afghanistan especially succumbed to the dictates of
imperial Russian and British forces which forged together a state
without regard to the principle of national self-determination.
Today the struggle in Afghanistna to a great extent is hinged on the
struggle among ethnic groups which are divided across international
borders with neighbors. The Afghan and Iranian situations have
simmered on back burners and boiled over at critical junctures in
the national histories of both countries as for example in the crises
of 1944-46 in northwestern Iran and in the continuous political
football that the Baluchistan and Pakhtunistan issues have become
for Afghanistan since the formation of Pakistan in 1947.
Decolonization in the Middle East (as in Africa) has left a legacy
that conferred independence without regard to self-determination.
Self-Determination and International Borders
Similar to the Middle East proper, in Central Asia, the
achievement of independence also may be described as a three-
staged process with an additional twist. Following imperial
conquest by the end of the nineteenth century, colonial entities were
formed which, in the period of decolonization retained their former
borders. In Central Asia, the end of Tsarist imperialism by 1920
ushered in a period similar to the mandate stage in the Middle East
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 represents the de-
colonization which in the Middle East occured after World War II.
The added twist is that that at the close of the second stage,
Moscow retained former Tsarist lands in large part because of the
application of the principle of self-determination as a means of
justification for the lack of total decolonization. In general outline,
during the 1920s Bolshevik planners put into effect aspects of the
principle of national self-determination, a lure that attracted key
ethnic groups into cooperation with Russian schemes to divide its
Central Asian domains into contending republics. National self-
determination, lying at the heart of Soveit nationality policy,
divided previously relatively homgeneous people into ethnic clumps
hammered together as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Turkmens and
Tajiks. Today, during this second stage of decolonization, the Soviet
republics have reluctantly become independent countries. In all
cases except that of the Karakalpaks, the ethnic territories carved
for each major ethnic group have changed now from legally sovereign
Soviet republics into independent states.
However, despite the touting of the principle of national self-
determination, the new current states in fact differ only in degree
from those states such as Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey, to
name only a few, where the self-determination principle was not
considered. Therefore, despite the cynical or idealistic motives of
Bolshevik planners, the borders for Cental Asian republics that have
changed from internal in international, also separate members of
ethnic groups. From that perspective, borders are being questioned
and could become a source of conflict.
For a variety of reasons, including ethnic distribution, economic
viability, and deliberate machination to render weak the emerging
entity, Soviet republic borders are long, contorted and altogether not
inclusive, even originally, of all the ethnic group for which a
particular republic is named. Moreover as in the case of the border
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as recently as 1962 the border
was shifted essentially by Moscow dictate.
Therefore, during the second stage of the process of
decolonization, several steps were taken that today complicate the
internal borders of Central Asia. First, an attempt was made to
apply the principle of self-determination, thought in a flawed
manner. Second, because the inherited borders were changed in the
past, an internal Soviet precedent exists which today can justify
calls for further changes.
Setting aside for the moment the problem of international
borders, as between Afghanistan and Central Asia, or Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and Russian and Chinese Central Asia, all products of
European imperial desisions as in the case of the Middle East proper,
the internal borders of Central Asia present a glaring case of the
long-term damaging effects of the application of the principle of
ethnic self-determination. As issues of self-determination and the
drawing of new borders arise in Yugoslavia and in Czechoslovakia,
the Imperfect solution that self-determination can become Is
highlighted by the case of Central Asia.
The problem of internal Soviet borders that now have acquired
international staatus is further complicated by the voluntary and
involuntary movement of millions of non-Central Asians into Central
Asian territories throughout the Tsarist and Soviet periods. As on
the Chinese side of the border where (Han) Chinese even at present
continue to Immigrate into locations occupied for centuries by
Uighurs and Kazakhs, the local populations of Central Asia too have
been swamped or totally displaced by Russians, Germans,
Unkrainians and others. This process of settlement by outsiders has
further confounded any benefits that might have accured from an
ethnic-focused territorial policy.
Thus, whether as a result of long accepted imperial colonial
border deliniation or as a result of Russian attempts to create
ethnic based Soviet republics, the effect at present is that of new
and old international boundaries that threaten the equilibrium of
existing countries. Self-determination, then emerges as an
imperfect solution to the problem of multi-ethnic states unless It is
8accompanied by major population relocation schemes, a redrawing of
all international borders, and potentially most harmful of all to
world progress and the reduction of xenophobia, a prohibition of
immigration. Despite such draconian measure, the potential for
conflict would still exist in the form of economic disputes over
natural and water resouces, and perhaps even historical and cultural
heritage. As Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and even Iraq have
undergone shattering political and military experiences from 1978 to
1991, the national identities that might have been developed through
integrative processes (consciption, internal economies,
bureaucracies, and especially education) have been torn to expose
potential ethnic conflict. Applying the principle of self-determin-
ation to any of these cases, while a tempting solution for problems
of internal struggles for equality and political power, appears, in
the light of the Central Asian experience to offer little chance for a
future free of ethnic conflict. This, together with the certainty that
a change in one international border, such as that between Iraq,
Turkey and Iran to accomodate the minimal demands for Kurdish
unification, would spur desire for change along every other
international border to the east of that area, gives pause to any
inclination to support the marrying of the principle of ethnic self-
determination to that of international borders.
Historic Claims Across International Borders
More arcane, yet closely linked to notions of national pride are
border claims that are based on historical conquest. Into this
category fall all the Chinese claims to former Soviet territories,
chiefly in Siberia but also in Central Asia, Israeli claims to the
West Bank, and Iranian claims to the Herat region. Some claims of
this nature, backed by cross-border ethnic situations carry more
credence such as the Afghan support of Pakhtunistan and Uzbek
support of irrendentism in northern Afghanistan. Of the many cases
that may effect Central Asia, these Chinese historic claims based on
the issue of unequal 19th century treaties between Russia and China,
ignore the more justifiable ethnic realities of the region. Yet it
appears not unlikely that, should Central Asian independence
threaten the Chinese hold on Xinjiang, the Chinese will attempt to
exercise historic border rights that they claim in order to threaten
or suppress Central Asian sovereignty. International awareness of
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this danger is critical.
Options to the "Ethnic Way to Straighten Out Borders"
The "ethnic way to straighten our borders", if ever possible,
would lead through a long period of bloodshed that not only disrupts
the status quo (In itself not sacrosanct), but also presents the
prospects of ethnically pure but inbred and intolerant states. World
progress cannout be achieved under conditions that would preserve
the ethnic purity of states through international border control
mechanisms detrimental to trade, communications and contact. On
the other hand, the unholding of international borders at all costs
could continue to result in the encouragement of dictatorial regimes
which are immune to outside pressures for handling ethnic conflict
without cruelty or even genocide. Here, the case of Iraq and its
minority Kurds and majority Shiites, both oppressed by a Sunni
minority holding political power, presents a current example in the
region. But the case of Uzbekistan with its Tajik, Kirgyz and
Russian poulations could become a parallel in the future.
If we accept self-determination and the related notions of ethnic
unity as destructive to the equilibrium of the region and not simply
na disruption of the status quo, then two other questions emerge
about the future of borders: First, which principles may be
encouraged to deal with the existence of minorities within existing
states? That is, minorities of Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras, Tajiks and
Baluch in Afghanistan, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, Uzbeks In Tajikistan,
and so forth are a source of instability at present, not just a threat
to the status quo. Second, how can contiguous countries and the
international system deal with territorial disputes along
International borders which have defied settlement in the past?
Particularly Important appear the problem of borders between Iraq
and Kuwait, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chinese Central Asia and the
new countries to the West.
Long term solutions may not lie simply in the preservation of the
status quo, whether it is regimes or international borders. Rather
solutions appear to lie in the easing of the tensions that lead to
conflict between ethnic groups. These tensions arise from unequal
distribution of rights and economic goods, and the chauvinistic
domination of a state by one privileged or majority group; i.e., the
Takritis in Baghdad, the Durrani Pushtuns in Afghanistan, the
Khojandi Tajiks in Tajikistan and the like. Following logically from
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this conclusion, three kinds of solutions, none mutually exclusive,
present themselves. First, encouragement of internal state
structures that promote political and economic equality. Second,
allowing a natural merging of some groups such as the Kazakhs and
Kyrgyz for example, or even the Uzbeks and the Tajiks. This process
requires the building of trust among groups and in principle this
solution harks back to the idealism of the sblizheniia/sliianiia
(coming together/merging) process developed under Soviet
nationality theory. Despite the current discrediting of the Soviet
theory and practice, certain ideals encompass an understanding of
the natural course of reality. The gradual and voluntary, rather than
forced, coming together of people and cultures is apparent
throughout the Western world. That it can take place elsewhere, and
perhaps as a faster pace due to the rapidity of communications and
growth of contact, seems highly probable given a stable world
environment . The third solution lies in the formation of regional
groups, supra-national organizations of contiguous states which
form not for mutual defence but for mutaul cooperation on many
fronts, especially trade, education, investment, infrastructure (as in
electric and communications grids, and very important, In the
13
distribution of water resources and the regeneration of the
environnnent).
Conclusions
Briefly then, the new countries formed of Soviet republics in
Central Asia represent border problems which are not substantially
different from those present as a result of the much earlier
decolonization of the Middle East. Though more consciously based on
the spirit of national self-determination, none-the-less, these
states have flawed ethnic borders both among themselves and with
outside neighbors. Reconfiguring these borders appears a nearly
Impossible physical problem because of ethnic intermixing. From an
ethnic perspective as well as from the perspective of long-term
stability, the retention of the international border status quo
appears the best solution despite the heightened sense of ethnic
rights engendered by the principle of national self-determination so
vigorously championed by Moscow over a seventy year period. Rather
than dwell on ethnicity itself as a source of instability in Central
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Asia (and border adjustment as the answer to the problem), the
international community would do well to examine the menas by
which political rights, economic development and social justice can
be advanced in the region as a whole.
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